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Preface
Overview of Doctoral Dissertation
In recent years, the economies of agglomeration have come back into the spotlight not only
in developed countries but also in developing countries (e.g., World Bank, 2009). This
is because agglomeration is considered to play an important role in fostering economic
development at the regional and local levels. Benefits from agglomeration have been known
implicitly for a long time, and researchers have attempted to search for the source and nature
of agglomeration. For example, Marshall (1890) observes that agglomeration enables better
matching between job seekers and firms, better linkages between suppliers of intermediate
and final goods, and more active knowledge creation and spillover in agglomerated regions,
making regions more attractive and, thus, denser.
This doctoral dissertation sheds light on the role of geographical space in economic
activities. It pays special attention to three points of view that are important when consid-
ering the role of space in economic activities. First, this dissertation emphasizes the spatial
interaction arising from migration and trade. Unlike traditional assumptions of interna-
tional trade, the mobility of labor plays an important role in endogenously forming a core
region of economic activities. This is the same point that Krugman (1991a) focused on
particularly in the field known as the New Economic Geography (NEG). Second, this dis-
sertation elucidates spatial dependence across regional economies. It is clear that regional
economies are not independent but interdependent. In such a spatial structure, even a
region-specific shock affects neighboring economies through spatial spillover effects, which
include feedback loops or interplay effects. Third, this dissertation focuses on the bene-
fits from agglomeration and examines the extent to which our economic activities benefit
from agglomeration. It is said that agglomeration gives rise to positive and/or negative
externalities in myriad ways. These three points correspond to the three chapters of the
dissertation, respectively; discussions about space will be further deepened in each context.
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The importance of space has mostly been ignored in both mainstream economic and
econometric theories. Although the importance of spatial issues itself might have been
recognized by a majority of economists, they have had no way to model the spatial aspect
of economies (Krugman, 1995). As mentioned in Krugman (1991a), it was necessary to
move away from the standard approach that assumed constant returns to scale and per-
fect competition. Krugman (1991b) indeed overcame these problems and endogenously
described how economic activities concentrate in one region by offering a unifying general
equilibrium framework with particular attention to increasing returns to scale, monopolistic
competition, transport costs, and mobile workers across regions. As a result, his seminal
paper opened a new era of the NEG in the early 1990s. Currently, the seminal textbooks
of the NEG are easily found (e.g., Fujita et al., 1999; Baldwin et al., 2003; Combes et al.,
2008b; Fujita and Thisse, 2013). I am, therefore, greatly indebted to the researchers who
have enabled the historical development of spatial economics over the past two centuries,
as documented in Fujita (2010).
It should be noticed that little attention has been paid to space in the mainstream econo-
metric theory as well. Even if regional data are used, we have imposed a strict assumption
that each regional unit is independent by using random sampling. Unlike individual or
household data, independence across observations does not hold, even though we carefully
consider random sampling in the regional data, which finally leads to inconsistent and/or
inefficient estimators. To tackle these issues, many empirical economists and econometri-
cians are currently paying more attention to spatial econometrics. Anselin (2010) gives an
overview of the evolution of spatial econometrics over the past three decades, concluding
that there is room for the further development of spatial econometrics. In this doctoral
dissertation, I make extensive use of spatial econometric techniques.
This dissertation analyzes the Mexican economy. As mentioned in Krugman and Livas-
Elizondo (1996), Mexico has been experiencing a dynamic change in economic activities
since trade liberalization in the 1980s and 1990s. This has given rise to drastic changes
in the country’s domestic distribution patterns of firm location, employment, and indus-
trial structure. Regional and local economies have displayed grater interdependence with
increasing migration, improving infrastructure, and ongoing globalization. Space is, there-
fore, a key and essential factor for a better understanding of the current Mexican economy.
Throughout this doctoral dissertation, I attempt to uncover how space affects economic
activities in the Mexican economy.
An additional advantage of focusing on the Mexico is that the Mexican government has
improved statistical data since the early 2000s. Even micro-data are open to researchers
xiii
from around the world. Indeed, I use a micro-data set of Mexican workers in Chapter 3.
The Mexican government intends to make good use of the results of research conducted
by experts, and I hope that my doctoral research makes a significant contribution to their
policy making processes.
Abstracts of Chapters
This doctoral dissertation consists of three chapters. Chapter 1 deals with spatial interac-
tion arising from migration and trade. Chapter 2 focuses on spatial dependence in regional
business cycles and spatial spillover effects originating from region-specific shocks. Chapter
3 explores how workers employed in denser spaces benefit from agglomeration when firms
have branch networks. Space is a keyword throughout this doctoral dissertation. Detailed
summaries of the chapters follow.
Chapter 1 theoretically and empirically analyzes the relationship between regional un-
employment rates and agglomeration by introducing the standard search and matching
framework into a new economic geography model. Furthermore, we incorporate agglomera-
tion externalities into a search and matching framework. After our theoretical analysis, we
empirically examine relationships between regional unemployment rates and agglomeration
and between matching efficiency and agglomeration by using Mexican data. An important
prediction of our theory is that regional unemployment rates can be positively or negatively
correlated with agglomeration under negative agglomeration externalities on matching effi-
ciency. We empirically find that denser areas have comparatively low unemployment rates
even under negative agglomeration externalities on matching efficiency. Considering our
theoretical predictions, we conclude that in Mexico, the agglomeration effect lowering the
unemployment rates is much stronger than that increasing the rates.
Chapter 2 investigates how a region-specific shock propagates outward toward neigh-
boring regions when regional business cycles are spatially dependent. For this purpose, we
model business cycles by introducing a spatial autoregressive process into a Markov switch-
ing model. The advantage of this model is that it enabled us to numerically simulate spatial
spillover effects. Therefore, we were able to demonstrate how the economic crisis in 2008–
2009 spread across Mexican states. We find that business cycles across these states were
spatially dependent and that a regime switch from expansion to recession caused conditions
in the neighboring economies to deteriorate.
Chapter 3 studies how workers earn higher wages in denser areas using micro-data for
Mexican labor. Previous studies show that higher population density raises wages. How-
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ever, it has been unclear how workers receive benefits from agglomeration when firms have
branch networks. To clarify this issue, we focus on branches of the Mexican commer-
cial banks. If workers directly benefit from local agglomeration, higher wages are paid in
branches located in denser areas. If workers indirectly benefit from agglomeration through
branch networks, the banks’ fixed effects are positively correlated with population density.
Furthermore, we analyze heterogeneous effects of agglomeration on wages between high-
and low-skilled workers. We find that banks locating branches in denser areas tend to
pay workers better, suggesting that workers indirectly benefit from agglomeration through
banks’ branch networks. Thus, branch networks would provide additional agglomeration
effects, especially for workers employed in less dense areas. We find that high-skilled work-
ers are likely to enjoy direct benefits from local agglomeration, whereas low-skilled workers
are not within the banks’ branch networks. To make matters worse, low-skilled workers can
be affected negatively by agglomeration owing to congestion effects.
1Chapter 1
Regional Unemployment Rates in an Agglomeration
Economy: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis∗
1.1 Introduction
Since the publication of Krugman (1991b), new economic geography (NEG) studies have
examined the agglomeration mechanism of economic activities, with particular attention
to the increasing returns to scale, monopolistic competition, transport costs, and mobile
labor across regions (e.g., Fujita et al., 1999). With regarding to regional labor markets
and agglomeration, Marshall (1890) observes that the concentration of economic activi-
ties facilitates the job search and matching between employers and job seekers in terms of
industry-specific skills. Similarly, Rosenthal and Strange (2001), investigating the determi-
nants of agglomeration, find that labor market pooling fosters agglomeration. Despite such
observations and studies, only limited attention has been paid to job search and regional
unemployment issues in the NEG literature.1 Thus, we do not fully understand the un-
derlying mechanism acting between regional unemployment rates and the agglomeration of
∗I would like to specially thank Kensuke Teshima and Yasuhiro Sato for their very helpful comments
and suggestions. I also thank Jorge Alonso, Hiroshi Goto, Nobuaki Hamaguchi, Naoto Jinji, Hisaki Kono,
Toshihiro Okubo, Mun Se-il, Koji Shintaku, and all the participants in the CIE Brown Bag Seminar at
the Instituto Tecnolo´gico Auto´nomo de Me´xico (ITAM), the third spring meeting of the Japan Society of
International Economics at Fukuoka University, and the Brown Bag Lunch Seminar at Kyoto University for
their useful comments and suggestions. Any remaining errors are naturally my own. I am grateful to those
at the ITAM for all the support that I received during my stay there. This research was carried out under
a scholarship granted by the Government of Mexico through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mexico.
1Note that the NEG literature has also contributed to uncovering wage inequality from the perspective
of geographical networks. For example, many empirical papers have shown that market potential leads to
higher regional nominal wages (e.g., Redding and Venables, 2004; Hanson, 2005; Hering and Poncet, 2010).
However, these studies are based on theoretical models under perfectly competitive labor markets.
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economic activities.
In the recent NEG literature, attempts have been made to tackle job search and unem-
ployment issues.2 For example, Epifani and Gancia (2005) and Francis (2009) developed
a dynamic NEG model by introducing a search and matching mechanism.3 Their models
predict a lower unemployment rate in agglomerated regions in the long-run. On the other
hand, motivated by that unemployment rates in high-density regions seem to be higher
than in low-density regions from developed countries data, vom Berge (forthcoming) ex-
tended Krugman’s (1991) model by introducing a search and matching framework.4 His
model shows that the unemployment rates in agglomerated regions are comparatively high.5
However, as mentioned by Zierahn (forthcoming), when NEG models show full agglomer-
ation under the spatial equilibrium, it indicates that unemployed workers do not live in
the periphery region.6 That is, under full agglomeration, the unemployment rate in the
periphery region virtually becomes zero (or cannot be defined), whereas it is always positive
in the agglomerated region. As such, the results obtained from full agglomeration models
cannot exactly capture situations in the periphery regions. Therefore, we investigate the
relationship between regional unemployment rates and agglomeration by using an NEG
model with partial agglomeration.
Following the framework proposed by vom Berge (forthcoming), we develop a multi-
region model of Helpman (1998) by incorporating a search and matching mechanism.7
Unlike Krugman (1991b), Helpman (1998) lays more emphasis on the dispersion force aris-
ing from non-tradable local services. For example, the concentration of economic activities
raises the prices of land and housing owing to the increased demand for them. Consequently,
this type of dispersion force leads to partial agglomeration. Thus, focusing on Helpman’s
(1998) model, we offer fresh insight into the regional distribution of unemployment rates in
2Some theoretical mechanisms that generate unemployment need to be introduced (e.g., efficiency wage
or search and matching frameworks). This paper employs the search and matching model proposed by
Pissarides (2000). Rogerson et al. (2005) offer a review of this literature. In the literature of international
trade, Helpman and Itskhoki (2010) developed an international trade model to analyze the effect of labor
market rigidity on trade flow. Unlike those studies, we focus on the trade model dealing with migration
between regions.
3Unlike the search and matching framework, Zierahn (forthcoming) introduces the efficiency wage and
congestion costs due to agglomeration into Krugman’s (1991) model.
4Unlike vom Berge (forthcoming), we find both positive and negative relationships between unemploy-
ment and agglomeration, expressed as population size or population density in empirical studies. See for
example Simon (1988), Izraeli and Murphy (2003), and Chiang (2009).
5vom Berge (forthcoming) introduces regions into the model developed by Ziesemer (2005), who extended
Pissarides (2000, Chap. 3) model by introducing monopolistic competition.
6Agricultural workers still live there in the case of Krugman-type models.
7An extension of Helpman (1998) can be found in Pflu¨ger and Tabuchi (2010). They assume that a firm
uses land as a production input.
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an agglomeration economy. Furthermore, to analyze how transport costs affect the relation-
ship between regional unemployment rates and agglomeration, we carry out a numerical
analysis of the theoretical model.8
A contribution of this paper is to incorporate agglomeration externalities into a search
and matching framework. As observed in Marshall (1890), denser areas seem to promote
job matching between job seekers and firms. However, this is not necessarily true in the
current economy. Recent empirical studies provide two contradictory evidences. Hynni-
nen and Lahtonen (2007) show a positive relationship between matching efficiency and
population density, whereas Kano and Ohta (2005) show a negative one. Therefore, our
theoretical model assumes positive or negative agglomeration externalities on matching ef-
ficiency. Consequently, our model is able to describe a wide variety of relationships between
unemployment rates and agglomeration.
Our study also contributes to the literatures of development economics and wage curve.
Beginning with Harris and Todaro (1970), the literature of development economics has
studied urban unemployment and migration. Given the exogenously high wage in urban
area, Harris and Todaro (1970) showed that urban unemployment rate increases on account
of excessive workers immigrating into a city in response to higher expected wage. There-
fore, a positive relationship between wages and unemployment rates can be expected.9 In
contrast, the literature of the wage curve, beginning with Blanchflower and Oswald (1994),
has studied the negative relationship between regional wages and unemployment rates.10
Our theoretical model therefore attempts to uncover this contradictory observation.
We specifically describe three relationships between nominal wages, unemployment
rates, and agglomeration across regions, as clearly illustrated in Figure 1.1. Note that
a consensus already exists on the positive relationship between wages and agglomeration
(e.g., Combes et al., 2008a; Mion and Naticchioni, 2009; Combes et al., 2010; de la Roca
and Puga, 2012), and this always holds in our model. In addition, previous studies show
that agglomeration has a decreasing effect on unemployment rates in the production side.11
Further, if agglomeration is assumed to have positive/negative externalities on matching
8Although NEG models provide insightful policy implications, their theoretical and numerical analyses
are usually limited to two-region cases to avoid mathematical difficulties, which are also known as three-ness
(Combes et al., 2008b, Chap. 4). Although we build a multi-region model for the theoretical part of our
study, our numerical analysis is restricted to a case of two symmetric regions.
9Contrary to the prediction of Harris and Todaro (1970), Suedekum (2005) showed a lower unemployment
rate and higher wage in agglomerated region by endogenously expressing higher urban wage within the NEG
framework.
10See Card (1995) for a literature review of the wage curve.
11See also Suedekum (2005) and Zierahn (forthcoming).
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Figure 1.1: Relationship between Wage, Unemployment Rate, and Agglomeration
efficiency, it would also lead to negative/positive effects on the unemployment rate. Con-
sequently, the advantage of our model is that we explain both the positive and negative
relationships between nominal wages and unemployment rates, while also endogenously ex-
plaining the higher wages in agglomerated regions. Therefore, we believe that this paper
makes a valuable contribution to the Harris–Todaro model and the wage curve literature.
This paper also includes an empirical analysis of the relationship between regional un-
employment rates and agglomeration. We use Mexican municipal data and control for
spatial dependence within the municipal data by using spatial econometric methods. We
also estimate the matching function to examine the relationship between matching effi-
ciency and agglomeration. Finally, we draw a conclusion about the relationship between
unemployment rates and agglomeration by taking into account both the estimation results.
As mentioned in Krugman and Livas-Elizondo (1996), Mexico has experienced a dy-
namic change in economic activities since the trade liberalization in the 1980s and 1990s.
In the meantime, this movement brought about drastic changes in the country’s domestic
distributional employment pattern. According to Hanson (1998), the Mexico–US border
states attracted more manufacturing workers. For example, Hanson (1998) shows that
the share of regional employment in the Mexico-US border states was 21.0% in 1980 but
29.8% in 1993. On the other hand, the manufacturing workers tend to leave the Mexico
City metropolitan area (their share came down from 46.4% in 1980 to 28.7% in 1993).
However, little attention has been paid to the relationship between regional unemployment
rates and agglomeration in the Mexican literature; therefore, we try to examine whether
the agglomerated regions have higher or lower unemployment rates.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 builds a multi-region
model of Helpman (1998) consisting of a standard search and matching framework. Section
3 numerically analyzes a case of two symmetric regions. Section 4 details the empirical
strategy used for this study. Section 5 explains the data used. Section 6 discusses the
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estimation results. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
1.2 The Model
Following vom Berge (forthcoming), we extend the multi-region model of Helpman (1998)
by introducing a search and matching framework. We consider an economy with R re-
gions having both manufacturing and land/housing sectors. The manufacturing sector is
monopolistically competitive, and each firm produces one variety of a differentiated good
under increasing returns to scale. Labor is a unique production input. On the other hand,
the land/housing sector is perfectly competitive; land endowment in each region is fixed,
so that the supply of land/housing services is also given; consumers have their own land
equally. There are two types of workers, the employed and the unemployed. We assume
that both types of the worker are mobile across regions in the long-run, and that there are
no migration costs. We introduce job search and matching frictions into the regional labor
markets. Unemployed workers search for jobs in their own living regions, and spatial job
search is not allowed. For the present purpose, we focus on steady state analysis.
1.2.1 Matching Function
We first assume that there are search and matching frictions in the regional labor markets.
The number of matches existing between the job seekers and vacancies is determined by
the following matching function:
miLi = Aim(uiLi, viLi), i = 1, 2, . . . , R (1.1)
where mi is the matching rate, ui is the unemployment rate, vi is the vacancy rate in
terms of labor, Ai is the matching efficiency, and Li is the labor force, with the subscript
i indicating region i. Note that job matches are made only within region i. We further
assume that the matching function is increasing in both variables, homogeneous of degree
one, concave, and twice continuously differentiable, and that m(uiLi, 0) = m(0, viLi) = 0.
12
As mentioned earlier, we assume that agglomeration of economic activity has externalities
on the matching efficiency Ai; our specification is as follows:
Ai = A(Li/S¯i)
ξ, (1.2)
12See Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) for details of the matching function, including empirical findings.
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where A is constant, S¯i represents land endowment (or fixed supply of land/housing ser-
vices), and ξ is the elasticity of agglomeration to matching efficiency. Thus, Li/S¯i can be
interpreted as a kind of population density in region i.
Given the matching function (1.1), the rates at which vacancies are filled and unem-
ployed workers leave unemployment can be expressed respectively as
qi(θi) ≡ Aim(uiLi, viLi)
viLi
and θiqi(θi) ≡ Aim(uiLi, viLi)
uiLi
,
where θi ≡ vi/ui denotes the labor market tightness. From the above assumptions, we can
easily verify that both qi(θi) > 0 and q
′
i(θi) < 0 hold for a given value of Ai.
1.2.2 Consumer and Worker
For simplicity, we assume a static consumer problem; consumers do not save any part of
their income but spend all of it in each period.13
Further, each consumer has identical Cobb–Douglas preferences for two goods; that is,
Ui =
1
μμ(1− μ)1−μM
μ
i H
1−μ
i , (1.3)
where 0 < μ < 1 is the expenditure share for manufactured goods, Mi is the composite
consumption of manufactured goods in region i, and Hi is the consumption of land/housing
services in region i.14 The composite consumption of manufactured goods is given by the
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function
Mi =
⎛
⎝ R∑
j=1
∫ nj
0
mji(ν)
(σ−1)/σdν
⎞
⎠σ/(σ−1) ,
where mji(ν) is region i’s consumption of variety ν produced in region j, nj the number
of varieties produced in region j, and σ > 1 the elasticity of substitution between any two
varieties. The budget constraint of region i is given by GiMi + p
H
i Hi = Yi, where Gi is the
price index for manufactured goods, pHi is the price of land/housing services, and Yi is the
regional income.
From utility maximization, we obtain the following demand functions:
Hi =
(1− μ)Yi
pHi
, Mi =
μYi
Gi
, and mji(ν) = μpji(ν)
−σGσ−1i Yi, (1.4)
13This simplification, however, does not change the essential results of our model.
14We modify the methodology of Pflu¨ger and Tabuchi (2010) to describe a land/housing market.
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where pji(ν) is region i’s consumer price for variety ν imported from region j; the price
index in region i takes the following form:
Gi =
⎛
⎝ R∑
j=1
∫ nj
0
pji(ν)
1−σdν
⎞
⎠1/(1−σ) . (1.5)
By substituting demand functions (1.4) into utility function (1.3), we obtain the indirect
utility Vi of an individual living in region i:
Vi =
Ii
Gμi (p
H
i )
1−μ , (1.6)
where Ii is the income of the individual living in region i. Indirect utility can be interpreted
as the real income, that is, the individual’s income Ii deflated by the cost-of-living index
Gμi (p
H
i )
1−μ.
As mentioned earlier, there are two types of workers in the economy, the employed
and the unemployed. Let Vei and V
u
i denote the indirect utilities of the employed and the
unemployed, respectively. We assume that while the employed earns wi, the unemployed
receives unemployment benefit z from the government. The unemployment benefit is ex-
ogenously given. The government imposes a tax τ on all the workers in order to finance the
unemployment benefits. Further, we assume that the rate of interest r is common across all
regions. Thus, the steady state Bellman equations for the employed and the unemployed
are, respectively, given as follows:
rEi = V
e
i + δ(Ui − Ei),
rUi = V
u
i + θiqi(θi)(Ei − Ui),
(1.7)
where Ei and Ui are the present discounted values (PDV) of the expected real income
stream for the employed and the unemployed, respectively, and δ is the job destruction
rate. In the long-run, individuals decide to migrate depending on the expected PDV from
continuing to live in the region.
1.2.3 Producer Behavior
We assume that the prices of all the varieties produced within a region are identical in view
of the same production technology used and therefore denote the price of all the varieties
produced in region i as pi. We assume that a manufactured good is traded between regions
i and j with iceberg transport cost Tij. Thus, if one unit of any variety of manufactured
goods is shipped from region i to region j, only 1/Tij of the unit arrives. A variety of
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manufactured goods produced in region i is sold at price pi in that region. If this variety is
shipped from region i to region j, the delivered price is
pij = piTij, Tij = Tji ≥ 1, Tii = 1, i, j = 1, 2, . . . , R.
The total amount of goods that a firm produces to satisfy the consumption demand of all
the regions therefore becomes
xi =
R∑
j=1
mijTij . (1.8)
Next, all the firms require not only fixed and marginal labor input for producing the
varieties but also recruiters for hiring their workers.15 Thus, the total labor input in region
i is
	i = F + cxi + γNi (1.9)
where F and c are respectively the fixed and marginal labor requirements for production,
γ is the marginal labor requirement for recruiting per vacancy, and Ni is the number of
vacancies that a firm needs to post. The first two terms correspond to the standard Dixit–
Stiglitz assumption of increasing returns to scale. The third term indicates that a firm
needs to hire recruiters to keep their workers from decreasing because the workers quit
their jobs at a job destruction rate of δ. The same wage wi is paid to both workers and
recruiters. The total cost is therefore wi	i.
A vacant job is filled with a probability of qi(θi), and an occupied job is destructed with
a probability of δ. Thus, the dynamics of total labor input is given by
	˙i = qi(θi)Ni − δ	i. (1.10)
A firm maximizes the PDV of its expected profit with respect to the produced quantity
xi and number of vacancies Ni as follows:
16
max
xi,Ni
∫ ∞
0
e−rt [pi(xi)xi − wi(F + cxi + γNi)] dt
s.t. x˙i =
1
c
[(qi(θi)− γδ)Ni − δ(F + cxi)]
lim
t→∞
[
λ(t)e−rtxi(t)
]
= 0
(1.11)
15This formulation is developed by vom Berge (forthcoming), following Pissarides (2000, Chap. 3) and
Ziesemer (2005).
16Using (1.9), (1.10), and the envelop theorem, we obtain the dynamic equation on production x˙ in (1.11).
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where pi(xi) is the mill price in region i, and λ(t) the Lagrange multiplier. Solving the
current value Hamiltonian, we obtain the optimal mill price with a constant markup on
marginal costs as follows:
pi =
σ
σ − 1cwi
(
1 +
rγ
qi(θi)
)(
1− γδ
qi(θi)
)−1
. (1.12)
Note that this price is higher than that of the standard Dixit–Stiglitz monopolistic com-
petition model because the multiplication of the second and third terms is greater than
one. Intuitively, the marginal cost consists of three parts. The first two terms give the
workers’ wage for producing the additional quantity xi and the expected cost of hiring a
worker, and the third term captures the cost of hiring the workers engaged in production
and recruitment.17 If the job search cost is zero (γ = 0), this price takes the same form
obtained for the standard Dixit–Stiglitz model.
Let Vi and Ji be the PDVs of the expected profit from the vacant and occupied jobs
respectively. Then, the steady state Bellman equation for a vacancy is given by
rVi = −γw˜i + qi(θi)(Ji − Vi), (1.13)
where w˜i ≡ wi/pi is the real wage defined in terms of firm.
All the profit opportunities from creating new jobs are exploited in equilibrium, and the
value of the vacant jobs becomes zero (Vi = 0). Hence, the equilibrium condition yields
Ji =
γw˜i
qi(θi)
. (1.14)
From this equation, since 1/qi(θi) is the expected duration of a vacant job, the expected
profit from a new job is equal to the expected cost of hiring a worker in equilibrium.
1.2.4 Wage Bargaining
In a wage bargaining process, we endogenize the labor market tightness θi. Each firm in
a standard search and matching model is assumed to have only one job. Although a firm
in our model employs multiple workers, we consider the bargaining process in a similar
17To understand the third term, we manipulate (1.17) to obtain
δ(F + cxi)
qi(θ)Ni
= 1− γδ
qi(θi)
< 1.
The left-hand side shows how the quitting workers engaged in production are filled up from among the newly
hired workers, implying that a part of the newly hired workers are engaged in recruitment.
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manner.18 Following Pissarides (2000, Chap. 3), we assume that the wages of workers
are fixed in Nash bargains, in which the firm gets involved with each worker separately,
considering the wages of all the other workers as given. This assumption results in a one-
to-one relationship between a worker and a job. The total surplus arising from a job match
(i.e., the net benefit of the worker and the firm from the unemployed worker starting to
work and the firm producing additional goods) is shared through Nash bargaining between
the worker and the firm:
w˜i = argmax(Ei − Ui)β(Ji − Vi)1−β ,
where 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 is the bargaining power of the workers. From the first-order condition,
the result of the bargaining is given by
(1− β)(Ei − Ui)J ′i = β(Ji − Vi)E′i.
By substituting (1.7) and (1.14) and imposing the equilibrium condition Vi = 0, we obtain
the following equation
w˜i = rUi + β
(
σ − 1
cσ
− rUi
)
.
With some manipulations, we obtain the following relationship between the nominal
wage and labor market tightness:
gi(wi, θi) ≡ (1− β)
(
1− zi
wi
)
− βγ [r + δ + θiqi(θi)]
qi(θi)− γδ = 0. (1.15)
This corresponds to the wage-setting curve in Pissarides (2000), but shows a nonlinear
function with regard to labor market tightness and wages in our case. From the implicit
function theorem, we obtain
dθi
dwi
= −∂gi/∂wi
∂gi/∂θi
> 0,
where a homogeneous degree one is assumed in the matching function.19 Since the un-
employment rate ui and labor market tightness θi are negatively correlated, this result
indicates a negative relationship between wage and unemployment rate.20
18Stole and Zwiebel (1996a,b) consider an extended version of Nash bargaining for multiple workers, in
which the firm and a worker divide the marginal surplus obtained from the firm producing goods by hiring
additional worker and the worker leaving the unemployed status. This assumption reflects the case in which
additional employment additionally affects the wages of the remaining workers. In this paper, we use a
simpler methodology employed by Pissarides (2000, Chap. 3).
19Under the assumption of a homogeneous degree one in matching function, we confirm that qi(θi) +
θiq
′
i(θi) > 0 holds.
20This result implies the existence of wage curve (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994). In case the regional
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1.2.5 Short-Run Equilibrium
We now consider a short-run equilibrium, characterized by a general equilibrium in each
region without migration.21 By substituting the price in (1.12) into the current profit in
(1.11) and imposing a zero-profit condition, the equilibrium output is given by
xi =
F (σ − 1)
c
(
1 +
σrγ
qi(θi)
)−1
. (1.16)
Note that the equilibrium output is lower than the output of a standard Dixit–Stiglitz
monopolistic competition model.
Since 	˙i = 0 in the steady state, by substituting (1.9), the number of vacancies in the
steady state becomes
Ni =
δ(F + cxi)
qi(θi)− γδ , (1.17)
where we assume qi(θi) > γδ so that the number of vacancies takes a positive value. Sub-
stituting the equilibrium output (1.16) and the number of vacancies (1.17) into the total
labor input (1.9), we obtain the equilibrium total labor input in region i as follows:
	i = Fσ
(
1 +
rγ
qi(θi)
)(
1 +
σrγ
qi(θi)
)−1(
1− δγ
qi(θi)
)−1
. (1.18)
Further, from the labor market clearing condition ni	i = (1− ui)Li, the number of firms is
given by
ni =
(1− ui)Li
Fσ
(
1 +
rγ
qi(θi)
)−1(
1 +
σrγ
qi(θi)
)(
1− δγ
qi(θi)
)
. (1.19)
From (1.8), the total sales of the variety produced in region i amount to
xi = μ
R∑
j=1
p−σi G
σ−1
j YjT
1−σ
ij . (1.20)
Choosing the convenient units of measurement for marginal labor requirement c = (σ−1)/σ
and fixed labor requirement F = μ/σ, we simplify the model outcomes. Thus, from (1.12),
labor markets are homogeneous with regard to job destruction rates and job matches, a negative correlation
could arise between the regional unemployment rates and nominal wages. This result is quite similar to Sato
(2000), who shows that even when workers are mobile, the wage curve can be observed by using a theoretical
search framework assuming different productivities across the regions and a monocentric city structure.
21For ease of expression and interpretation, a nume´raire good is not particularly set up. This is not to
lose generality of our model analysis and draw model implications for numerical analysis.
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(1.16), and (1.20), we obtain the NEG wage equation:
wi = Γ(θi)
⎡
⎣μ R∑
j=1
YjG
σ−1
j T
1−σ
ij
⎤
⎦1/σ , (1.21)
where
Γ(θi) =
(
1 +
σrγ
qi(θi)
)1/σ (
1 +
rγ
qi(θi)
)−1(
1− δγ
qi(θi)
)
. (1.22)
The sum in brackets gives the RMP ≡ μ∑Rj=1 YjGσ−1j T 1−σij , expressing the sum of the
regional income discounted by the price index, and weighted by the transport cost. Even
if we assume the frictions in the regional labor markets, the standard implication for NEG
holds; that is, the goodness of accessibility to other markets increases the nominal wages.
Following the assumption of an identical price for all the varieties produced within a
region, the price index takes the following form:
Gi =
⎡
⎣ R∑
j=1
nj(pjTji)
1−σ
⎤
⎦1/(1−σ) . (1.23)
By substituting (1.12) and (1.19) into (1.23) and with normalization, we obtain
Gi =
⎡
⎣ R∑
j=1
(1− uj)LjΓ(θj)σw1−σj T 1−σji
⎤
⎦1/(1−σ) . (1.24)
As mentioned earlier, wage equation, RMP, and price index are essentially identical with
vom Berge (forthcoming).
The price of land/housing services pHi is determined at equilibrium, where land endow-
ment (or fixed supply of land/housing services) S¯i and the regional demand for land/housing
services Hi are equal. Thus, the price of land/housing services in region i is as follows:
pHi =
(1− μ)Yi
S¯i
. (1.25)
The regional income, Yi, includes the income of every employed and unemployed worker
living in region i. The respective disposable income of the employed and unemployed
workers are given by Iei = wi + h− τ and Iui = z + h− τ , where h is the land rent and τ is
the tax rate. Since all the individuals have their own land equally, the land rent is equally
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redistributed.22 Thus, the land rent is given by
h =
1− μ
μ
∑R
j=1[wj(1− uj) + zuj − τ ]Lj∑R
j=1 Lj
. (1.26)
Therefore, the regional income Yi becomes
Yi = [wi(1− ui) + zui − τ ]Li + 1− μ
μ
Li∑R
j=1 Lj
⎡
⎣ R∑
j=1
(
wj(1− uj) + zuj − τ
)
Lj
⎤
⎦ . (1.27)
Further, the individual real income takes the following forms:
V
e
i =
wi + h− τ
Gμi (p
H
i )
1−μ , and V
u
i =
z + h− τ
Gμi (p
H
i )
1−μ . (1.28)
Next, we consider labor market tightness and unemployment rates. Given wi, labor
market tightness is determined in (1.15). Since the inflow and outflow of unemployment
are equalized in steady state equilibrium, we obtain δ(1−ui)Li = θiqi(θi)uiLi. Solving this
with respect to ui, we obtain the so-called Beverage curve:
ui =
δ
δ + θiqi(θi)
. (1.29)
The tax rate τ is determined to balance the budget for tax revenue and expenditure for
unemployment benefits as follows:
τ
R∑
j=1
Lj = z
R∑
j=1
ujLj . (1.30)
Finally, the matching function is assumed to take the Cobb–Douglass form with constant
returns to scale
Aim(uiLi, viLi) = Ai(uiLi)
α(viLi)
1−α, (1.31)
where α is the matching elasticity. This specification of the matching function is also used
in the empirical analysis.
1.3 Long-Run Equilibrium: A Two-Region Case
In this section, we numerically analyze the properties of our model.23 We limit our numerical
analysis to a two-region case (R = 2) owing to mathematical difficulties.
22See Appendix 1.A for details of the derivation.
23Numerical analysis is conducted using the Ox Console 7.01 (Doornik and Ooms, 2006).
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1.3.1 Spatial Equilibrium
We assume that workers are mobile across regions in response to the expected PDV differ-
entials in the long-run. For convenience of notation, we denote the shares of labor force in
regions 1 and 2 as s1 = L1/(L1+L2) and s2 = 1−s1, respectively. The regional differentials
in the expected PDVs are then expressed as follows:
Δω(s1) ≡ ω1(s1)− ω2(s1), (1.32)
where the expected PDV from living in region i is expressed as ωi(s1) = (1−ui(si))E(s1)+
ui(si)U(s1), with the PDVs of the employed and the unemployed worker living in region i
given respectively as
Ei(s1) =
(r + θiqi(θi))V
e
i + δV
u
i
r(r + δ + θiqi(θi))
and Ui(s1) =
θiqi(θi)V
e
i + (r + δ)V
u
i
r(r + δ + θiqi(θi))
. (1.33)
Note that the wage wi, price index Gi, price of land/housing services p
H
i , land rent h,
labor market tightness θi, unemployment rate ui, and tax τ are functions of si. A spatial
equilibrium arises at s∗1 ∈ (0, 1) when Δω(s1) = 0, at s1 = 0 when Δω(0) ≤ 0, or at
s1 = 1 when Δω(1) ≥ 0. Any adjustment process over time t is governed by the following
differential equation:
ds1
dt
≡ s˙1 = Δω(s1)s1(1− s1), (1.34)
where the equilibrium is stable when the slope of s˙1 is negative. The parameter setting for
the numerical analysis is shown in Table 1.1.
1.3.2 Regional Labor Markets When Agglomeration Has No Externalities on Matching
Efficiency
We first consider the benchmark case in which agglomeration has no externalities on the
matching efficiency. Panel (a) of Figure 1.2 illustrates the regional differentials in PDVs
of the employed and the unemployed for three cases of transport costs (T = 1.5, 1.6, 1.7).
When T = 1.7, we have three equilibria, two stable at s1 = 0.04, 0.96 and one unstable at
s1 = 0.50. When T = 1.6, we have two stable equilibria at s1 = 0.11, 0.89 and one unstable
equilibrium at s1 = 0.50. However, the stable equilibria shift inward. When T = 1.5, we
have a unique and stable equilibrium at s1 = 0.5.
Panel (b) of Figure 1.2 describes the unemployment differentials between regions 1 and
2 under the short-run equilibrium. When s1 > 0.5, the unemployment rate in region 1 is
always lower than that in region 2, where the relationship is robust under different values
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Table 1.1: Parameter Setting for Numerical Analysis
Parameter Explanation
1 ≤ T ≤ 2 Transport Cost
σ = 6 Elasticity of Substitution between Varieties
μ = 0.86 Expenditure Share for Manufactured Goods
δ = 0.03 Job Destruction Rate (i = 1, 2)
γ = 0.5 Marginal Labor Input for Recruiter per Vacancy
β = 0.5 Bargaining Power of Worker
S¯i = 1 Land Endowment (i = 1, 2)
r = 0.01 Interest Rate
z = 0.4 Unemployment Benefit
L1 + L2 = 1 Total Labor Force
A = 0.6 Constant of Matching Efficiency
α = 0.5 Matching Elasticity on Job Seekers
ξ = 0 Elasticity of Agglomeration to Matching Efficiency (Benchmark)
ξ = 0.02 Elasticity of Agglomeration to Matching Efficiency (Positive)
ξ = −0.02 Elasticity of Agglomeration to Matching Efficiency (Negative and Weak)
ξ = −0.06 Elasticity of Agglomeration to Matching Efficiency (Negative and Strong)
Notes: The matching function is Aim(uiLi, viLi) = Ai(uiLi)
α(viLi)
1−α, where Ai = A(Li/S¯)ξ.
of transport costs. This result derives from the fact that the nominal wage in a denser
region is always higher, resulting in a lower unemployment rate. In contrast, vom Berge
(forthcoming) shows opposite results. This is because the nominal wage in a denser region
is lower in the Krugman (1991b) model.
Panel (c) of Figure 1.2 summarizes the spatial equilibria with respect to transport costs.
The solid and dashed lines indicate stable and unstable equilibria respectively. A partial
agglomeration arises when the transport costs are high.24 In our model, the break and
sustain points coincide with each other. These points are at T = 1.53 in Panel (c) of Figure
1.2. Contrary to our results, vom Berge (forthcoming) shows a full agglomeration when the
transport costs are low.
Following our numerical results, we discuss mainly the regional labor market outcomes
in spatial equilibrium.25 We assume that region 1 has at least half of the labor force
24As shown in Pflu¨ger and Tabuchi (2010), a full agglomeration is never a stable spatial equilibrium in a
typical Helpman (1998) model. Intuitively, this is because if all the workers gather in one region, the price
of land/housing services in the other region becomes zero. Consequently, workers have an incentive to move
to the vacant region to enjoy higher utility; thus, a full agglomeration never arises.
25The figures for coefficient of variation of unemployment rates, labor market tightness θi (i = 1, 2),
relative nominal wage w1/w2, relative cost-of-living index (G1)
μ(pH1 )
1−μ/(G2)μ(pH2 )
1−μ, relative price index
for manufactured goods G1/G2, and relative price of land/housing services p
H
1 /p
H
2 are available in Appendix
1.B.
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Figure 1.2: Results from Numerical Analysis When Agglomeration Has No Externalities on
Matching Efficiency
Notes: The solid and dashed lines in Panel (b) denote stable and unstable equilibrium,
respectively. The parameters used in this numerical analysis are shown in Table 1.1.
(0.5 ≤ s1 < 1). Figure 1.3 illustrates how the regional shares of the employed workers,
unemployment rates, and labor market tightness vary depending on transport costs.
Panel (a) of Figure 1.3 shows that when transport costs are high, region 1 has a larger
share of the employed than region 2. In such a case, we call region 1 an employment
cluster, a core region, or an agglomerated region. Panel (b) of Figure 1.3 presents a lower
unemployment rate in the employment cluster. From the negative relationship between
unemployment rate and labor market tightness, as shown in Panel (c) of Figure 1.3, labor
market tightness in the employment cluster takes a higher value than that in a less dense
region, suggesting that the unemployed can easily find jobs, thus lowering the unemployment
rate in an agglomerated region.
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Figure 1.3: Numerical Simulation in Spatial Equilibrium When Agglomeration Has No
Externalities on Matching Efficiency
Notes: The parameters used in this numerical analysis are in shown Table 1.1.
1.3.3 Regional Labor Markets When Agglomeration Has Externalities on Matching Ef-
ficiency
We further explore three cases in which the agglomeration has externalities on the matching
efficiency. Figures 1.4, 1.5, and 1.6 present the results of numerical analysis for the three
cases, respectively. For ease of comparison with the benchmark case, each panel of the
figures corresponds to respective panels of Figure 1.2 and Panel (b) of Figure 1.3.
First, Figure 1.4 presents the results of numerical analysis for the case in which the
agglomeration has positive externalities on matching efficiency. We see that the spatial
distribution of workers does not change qualitatively compared to the benchmark case.
However, the positive agglomeration externalities on matching efficiency lower the disper-
sion force from congestion costs and widen the gap in unemployment rates. In both the
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Figure 1.4: Numerical Simulation Results When Agglomeration Has Positive Externalities
on Matching Efficiency
Notes: The solid and dashed lines in Panel (c) denote stable and unstable equilibria,
respectively. The parameters used in this numerical analysis are shown in Table 1.1.
short- and long-run, the unemployment rate in the employment cluster is relatively low.
Second, Figure 1.5 presents the results of numerical analysis for the case in which
the agglomeration has negative externalities on matching efficiency, but the relationship is
comparatively weak. In this case as well, the spatial distribution of workers does not change
qualitatively compared to the benchmark case. The negative and weak agglomeration
externalities on matching efficiency increase the dispersion force from congestion costs and
narrow down the regional gap of unemployment rates partly. Note that the unemployment
rate in the employment cluster becomes either lower or higher in the short-run depending
on the degree of agglomeration (s1).
Third, Figure 1.6 presents the results of numerical analysis for the case in which the
agglomeration has negative externalities on matching efficiency, but the relationship is
1.3 Long-Run Equilibrium: A Two-Region Case 19
-2.0
-1.6
-1.2
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
2.0
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Δω
(s
1)
s1
T=1.4
T=1.5
T=1.6
T=1.7
(a) Dynamics
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
u 1
-u
2
s1
T=1.4
T=1.5
T=1.6
T=1.7
(b) Unemployment Differentials
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0
s 1
T
(c) Spatial Equilibrium
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8
4.9
5.0
5.1
5.2
1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t R
at
e 
(%
)
T
Region 1
Region 2
(d) Unemployment Rate, ui
Figure 1.5: Numerical Simulation Results When Agglomeration Has Weak Negative Exter-
nalities on Matching Efficiency
Notes: The solid and dashed lines in Panel (c) denote stable and unstable equilibria,
respectively. The parameters used in this numerical analysis are shown in Table 1.1.
comparatively strong. The negative and strong agglomeration externalities on matching
efficiency increase the dispersion force from congestion costs and gradually widen the re-
gional gap of unemployment rates above a certain degree of the negative relationship. The
unemployment rate in the employment cluster is relatively high in the short- and long-run.
Another important result is that the nominal wage in the employment cluster is always
relatively high in all cases, which is consistent with the stylized facts of this literature.26
The theoretical predictions of this study are as follows. In the benchmark case in which
agglomeration has no externalities on the matching efficiency, the unemployment rate in
the employment cluster is relatively low so that agglomeration has a decreasing effect on
26See Appendix 1.B for numerical simulation results of the relative nominal wages in each case.
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Figure 1.6: Numerical Simulation Results When Agglomeration Has Strong Negative Ex-
ternalities on Matching Efficiency
Notes: The solid and dashed lines in Panel (c) denote stable and unstable equilibria,
respectively. The parameters used in this numerical analysis are shown in Table 1.1.
unemployment rates in the production side.27 However, agglomeration has a positive effect
on regional unemployment rates in a search and matching process when agglomeration gives
rise to negative externalities on the matching efficiency. When the negative agglomeration
externalities on matching efficiency are comparatively weak, the unemployment rate in the
employment cluster still remains partly low. When these externalities are comparatively
strong, the unemployment rate in the employment cluster becomes higher.
Some predictions of our model are different from vom Berge (forthcoming), who in-
corporated a search and matching framework into Krugman’s (1991) model. vom Berge
(forthcoming) showed a positive relationship between regional unemployment rates and ag-
27This result is essentially the same as Suedekum (2005) and Zierahn (forthcoming).
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glomeration through a negative relationship between nominal wages and agglomeration.28
However, the latter relationship is clearly inconsistent with empirical evidence. The ad-
vantage of our model is that we describe a wide variety of relationships between regional
unemployment rates and agglomeration, with the relationship between nominal wage and
agglomeration positive. Consequently, our unifying framework contains aspects of both
Harris and Todaro (1970) and Blanchflower and Oswald (1994). From our theoretical
predictions, we empirically examine the relationship between unemployment rates and ag-
glomeration, and between matching efficiency and agglomeration.
1.4 Empirical Analysis
1.4.1 Unemployment Rates and Agglomeration
First, we attempt to examine the relationship between regional unemployment rates and ag-
glomerations. As a proxy for agglomeration, we use employment density. We use municipal
data from Mexico for this analysis. More attention should be paid to spatial autocorrelation
when spatially small regional units are used. In this case, the observations are closely re-
lated to each other. If the spatial dependence across observations is ignored, the estimators
will be inconsistent or not efficient.29 To solve this problem, we use spatial econometric
methods. Thus, our regression models for unemployment rates are given by
log(ui,t) = ρ
R∑
j=1
bij log(uj,t) + ψ log(Dens
s
i,t) +Z
s
i,tφ+ εi,t, (1.35)
and
log(ui,t) = ψ log(Dens
s
i,t) +Z
s
i,tφ+ ei,t, ei,t = λ
R∑
j=1
bijej,t + εi,t, (1.36)
28This difference arises from the sector generating a dispersion force. Krugman’s (1991) model deals with
freely tradable agricultural goods, but the agricultural workers are not mobile. Helpman’s (1998) model
deals with the land/housing sector, whose services are consumed locally. Intuitively, in a Krugman-type
model, a full agglomeration emerges and no manufacturing worker lives in the periphery region. Therefore,
the unemployment rate in a periphery region is virtually zero. In other words, the nominal wage given by
equation (1.21) can be defined even in regions with no manufacturer and is lower in agglomerated region;
so the implicit unemployment rate also can be calculated. In contrast, in a Helpman-type model, there
is a partial agglomeration, and so manufacturing workers always live in the periphery region. Therefore,
higher nominal wage in the core region generates higher labor market tightness, leading to a further lower
unemployment rate.
29Regardless of endogeneity problem from employment density, OLS estimators are biased due to the
omitted variable when ρ = 0. In addition, the covariance matrix of OLS estimators are no more efficient
when λ = 0. See LeSage and Pace (2009) for detailed discussions
22 Chapter 1. Regional Unemployment Rates in an Agglomeration Economy
where ui,t is municipality i’ unemployment rate in year t, bij is the ijth element of the
spatial weight matrix (SWM), ψ is the key parameter of our interest, Denssi,t is the log of
spatially smoothed employment density, Zsi,t is a row vector of spatially smoothed control
variables, φ is a column vector of parameters for control variables, and ei,t and εi,t are
error terms. The control variables include the average years of schooling, rates of male and
female labor force participation, and shares of the population aged 15–24, 25–59, and 60
and above.
Note that raw municipal data are not appropriate because the commuting that flows
across municipal borders are not negligible at the municipality level and the local labor
markets do not necessarily coincide with the administrative areas. Therefore, we use spa-
tially smoothed municipal data in terms of the neighboring municipalities. See Section 1.5
for calculation of the spatially smoothed variables. To control for the endogeneity problem
of employment density, we estimate equations (1.35) and (1.36) by using the method of
instrumental variable (IV) and generalized method of moments (GMM). Our estimation
methodology is based on Kelejian and Prucha (1998).
1.4.2 Matching Efficiency and Agglomeration
We furthermore examine agglomeration externalities on matching efficiency. The estimation
procedure takes a two-step approach. In the first step, we estimate the regional matching ef-
ficiencies by estimating the matching function. From the logarithm of (1.31), the regression
model to be estimated is given by
log(Matchs,t) = α1 log(Seekers,t) + α2 log(Vacancys,t) + as + yeart + εs,t, (1.37)
where Matchs,t is the number of matched jobs in state s at time t, Seekers,t is the number of
job seekers, Vacancys,t is the number of vacancies, α1 and α2 are the elasticities of matching,
as = log(As) is the state fixed effect, yeart is the year dummy, and εs,t is the error term.
Note that our data set of job seeker, vacancy, and matched job is at the state level owing
to the data limitations, and that subscript s is used instead of i. The state fixed effect as
represents the regional differences in matching efficiency.30 If we assume constant returns
to scale in the matching function, then α2 = 1 − α1. In the estimation, we test the null
hypothesis of constant returns to scale.
In the second step, the estimated matching efficiency is regressed on employment density
30The state fixed effects are estimated by areg command in Stata.
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as follows:
aˆs = ϕ+ ξ log(Denss) + εs, (1.38)
where aˆs is the estimated matching efficiency, ϕ is the parameter for a constant term, ξ
is a parameter of our interest, the elasticity of employment density to matching efficiency
in equation (1.2), Denss is the employment density of state s, and εs is an error term.
Therefore, we examine the relationship between matching efficiency and agglomeration by
inspecting the coefficient estimate of Denss.
1.5 Data
1.5.1 Unemployment Rates and Agglomeration
We use the 2000 and 2010 Mexican population censuses.31 From the censuses, the National
System of Municipal Information (Sistema Nacional de Informacio´n Municipal, SNIM) pro-
vides its summarized municipal data on area, labor force (the employed and unemployed),
average years of schooling, labor force participation rate by gender, and the population
aged 15–24, 25–59, and 60 and above.32
We construct our data set as follows. The unemployment rate of municipality i is
calculated by the ratio of the employed to the labor force living in the municipality. Let
zsi,t denote the spatially local sum data of municipality i in year t, calculated as z
s
i,t =∑R
j=1 1ij(d)zj,t, where R stands for the number of municipalities, zj,t the raw data of
municipality j, and 1ij(d) the ijth element of the indicator matrix, in which the ijth
element takes the value of 1 if the distance between municipalities i and j is less than
d km and 0 otherwise.33 We set d = 40 km. Thus, the spatially smoothed employment
density is Denssi,t = Emp
s
i,t/Area
s
i,t, where Emp
s
i,t and Area
s
i,t are spatially local sums of
employed worker and area, respectively, of municipality i in year t. Further, the other
variables are also calculated using the same method.34 We drop the lowermost 1% and
the uppermost 99% of the distribution of unemployment rates.35. We use the spatially
31In population censuses, labor data are available for every ten years. The 1990 population census data
are also used for instrumental variables. We exclude Nicola´s Ru´ız in the state of Chiapas from the 2000
data owing to lack of labor data. Furthermore, we found some municipalities were originally lacking in the
2000 population census data.
32The data are available at the following Web site (URL: http://www.snim.rami.gob.mx/).
33SNIM also offers the latitude and longitude data of municipalities, from which the bilateral distances
between any two municipalities can be calculated by using the formula of Vincenty (1975).
34The average years of schooling is calculated as the spatially local sum of years of schooling divided by
the number of municipalities within a radius of dkm from municipality i.
35Observations of zero are excluded because they are included in the lowermost 1 percent. The municipality
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Table 1.2: Descriptive Statistics for Unemployment Analysis
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Year 2000
Unemployment Rate (%) 0.953 0.608 0.031 3.815
Employment Density (person/km2) 67.439 180.959 0.052 1386.694
Employment Density (person/km2) in 1990 46.685 130.523 0.068 1020.300
Years of Schooling 5.473 1.178 2.910 9.140
Male Labor Force Participation Rate (%) 68.691 6.173 30.764 84.692
Female Labor Force Participation Rate (%) 25.163 6.537 6.456 40.714
Share of Population Aged 15–24 (%) 19.137 1.337 13.225 23.186
Share of Population Aged 25–59 (%) 35.143 3.740 22.531 43.705
Share of Population Aged 60 and above (%) 8.278 2.102 2.589 16.767
Year 2010
Unemployment Rate (%) 4.037 2.626 0.067 16.266
Employment Density (person/km2) 79.295 203.179 0.056 1572.537
Employment Density (person/km2) in 1990 44.951 127.496 0.068 1020.300
Years of Schooling 6.689 1.149 4.081 10.360
Male Labor Force Participation Rate (%) 72.794 3.605 45.476 84.537
Female Labor Force Participation Rate (%) 27.180 8.085 4.212 48.474
Share of Population Aged 15–24 (%) 18.820 1.076 13.674 22.312
Share of Population Aged 25–59 (%) 39.422 3.661 27.211 46.881
Share of Population Aged 60 and above (%) 10.414 2.598 3.278 22.720
Notes: The numbers of observations in 2000 and 2010 are 2255 and 2387, respectively. The lowermost
1% and uppermost 99% of the distribution of unemployment rates are dropped. These municipal data are
spatially smoothed except for unemployment rates.
smoothed employment density of 1990 for IV, and so use the 1990 population census as
well.36 Table 1.2 gives the descriptive statistics of municipal data by year.
For our estimation, we use distance-based SWMs, which take the following form:
bij =
d−ηij∑R
j=1 d
−η
ij
where bij is the ijth element of an SWM, dij is the bilateral distance between municipalities
i and j, R is the number of municipalities, and η is a distance decay parameter. The bilateral
distance is calculated as the great-circle distance between two municipalities measured by
latitude and longitude (Vincenty, 1975). The SWMs are row-standardized. In this paper,
our estimation results are obtained from using distance-based SWMs (η = 5).37
of Nicola´as Ru´ız located in the state of Chiapas is also excluded owing to lack of data.
36There is no information of municipal area in 1990 population census. Therefore, we complement mu-
nicipal areas in 1990 with the 2000 population census. In that case, separated municipalities between 1990
and 2000 are added to original municipalities.
37Our main results do not change even if different values of η are used.
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1.5.2 Matching Efficiency and Agglomeration
The yearly job seeker, vacancy, and matched job data are available from the Secretariat
of Labor and Social Welfare (Secretar´ıa del Trabajo y Previsio´n Social, STPS). The time
span is from 2001 to 2011. The STPS offers services for the promotion of job matching
in job placement offices (Bolsa de Trabajo). The data include the number of applications
registered both for the first time and on subsequent occasions, the number of job vacancies,
and the number of matched jobs out of the vacant jobs registered.38 Table 1.3 presents the
descriptive statistics of job seeker, vacancy, and matched job by year.
We then calculate the employment density at the state level. For this, we use the 2000
population census. In the regression analysis at the second step, the dependent variable is
the matching efficiency by state estimated between 2001 and 2011. To avoid endogeneity
issues, we use the employment density of 2000. For robustness, we also use the employment
density of 1990 as an instrumental variable. A problem with employment density at the
state level is that some states have vast uninhabitable regions, leading to underestimated
employment densities. To mitigate this issue, we calculate the employment density as fol-
lows. The municipal employment density is first simply calculated and sorted by size. Then,
the number of the employed in municipalities and municipal areas are summed up respec-
tively until the share of the employed by state reaches 80%. Finally, the state employment
density is calculated as the employed–area ratio.
1.6 Empirical Results
1.6.1 Unemployment Rates and Agglomeration
Table 1.4 shows the estimation results for equations (1.35) and (1.36). Columns (1) and
(4) of Table 1.4 presents the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates for 2000 and 2010,
respectively. In Column (1), employment density has a significantly negative impact on
unemployment rates at the 5% level, but is insignificant even at the 10% level in 2010.
According to the robust LM tests for spatial dependence in the dependent variable and
error terms, the null hypotheses ρ = 0 and λ = 0 are rejected at least at the 5% level
in 2000 and 2010, respectively, and we need to control for spatial dependence.39 The
estimation results for 2000 and 2010 are given in Columns (2) and (3) and Columns (5) and
38A person can be hired once more depending on the type of employment (casual, temporary, or perma-
nent).
39We follow the hypothesis-testing methodology for spatial dependence proposed by Anselin et al. (1996).
See also Anselin (2006) for a brief summary.
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(6), respectively. As expected, the parameter estimates measuring spatial dependence in the
dependent variable and error terms are significantly positive in both years. The coefficient
estimates of employment density remain significantly negative even after controlling for
spatial dependence in 2000. However, employment density is no longer significant in 2010.
For robustness, we control for the endogeneity of employment density. Table 1.5 presents
the IV/GMM estimation results. In Columns (1) and (4), we control for the endogeneity
of employment density but do not control for spatial dependence in the dependent variable
and error terms. The Dubin–Wu–Hausman test shows that there exists an endogeneity
problem in regression model. From IV/GMM estimation, we find the coefficient estimates
of employment density significantly negative in 2000 and 2010. However, Robust LM Tests
suggest that spatial dependence should be controlled for. As earlier, Columns (2) and (3)
and Columns (4) and (5) show, respectively, the estimation results when spatial dependence
in the dependent variable and error terms are controlled for. In 2000, employment density
shows a significantly negative impact on unemployment rate. However, this is not the case
in 2010.
Our evidence on the negative relationship between unemployment rates and agglomera-
tion is robust for 2000, but not for 2010. When based exactly on our model, the unemploy-
ment differentials decreased as the transport costs fell, and the magnitude of the estimated
coefficient became smaller and the statistical significance might not be confirmed. An-
other important implication is that the negative relationship between unemployment and
agglomeration can be observed only when agglomeration has positive or weakly negative
externalities on the matching efficiency. In the next subsection, we examine the relationship
between matching efficiency and agglomeration.
1.6.2 Matching Efficiency and Agglomeration
Table 1.6 presents the estimation results of regression models (1.37) and (1.38). Column (1)
shows the estimation results of the matching function. The elasticity of job match to job
seeker is significant at the 5% level and takes the value of 0.33. The elasticity of job match
to vacancy is also significant at the 1% level and takes the value of 0.71. The null hypothesis
of constant returns to scale for the matching function is not rejected. Our estimates are
consistent with the results of most of the empirical studies on the matching function. Ac-
cording to a survey of Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001), the estimate of plausible elasticity
on job seeker lies in the range between 0.5 and 0.7.
Column (2) shows the estimation results of the agglomeration effect on matching effi-
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Table 1.6: Estimation Results for Matching Function
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable
Explanatory Variable log(Matchs,t)
State Fixed Effects
in Column (1)
(OLS)
State Fixed Effects
in Column (1)
(GMM)
Log of Employment Density −0.086∗∗∗ −0.081∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.027)
State Fixed Effects Yes
Log of Seeker 0.332∗∗
(0.150)
Log of Vacancy 0.714∗∗∗
(0.161)
Year Dummy Yes
Number of Observations 352 32 32
Adjusted R2 0.886 0.200
CRS Test, p-value 0.700
Dubin–Wu–Hausman Test, p-value 0.295
F -Test (Weak IV) 1536.740
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in the parentheses. Column (1) gives
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered by state. All regressions contain a constant term.
The instrumental variable for employment density shown in Column (3) is the employment density in 1990.
CRS Test indicates the hypothesis testing of constant returns to scale for the matching function. Dubin–
Wu–Hausman Test indicates hypothesis testing of endogeneity. F Statistic (Weak IV) is Cragg–Donald
Wald F statistic for test of weak instruments. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% level, respectively.
ciency. The elasticity of employment density estimated by OLS is significantly negative at
the 1% level. The elasticity of employment density estimated by GMM is also significantly
negative. Figure 1.7 clearly illustrates the negative relationship between matching efficiency
and employment density.
To sum up, the Mexican data examined show comparatively low unemployment rates
as well as matching efficiency in agglomerated regions. Taking into account the theoretical
prediction that when agglomeration has negative externalities on matching efficiency it will
have both positive and negative effects on regional unemployment rates, the agglomeration
effect lowering the unemployment rates in Mexico is much stronger than that increasing
the unemployment rates.
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Figure 1.7: Matching Efficiency and Employment Density
1.7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we theoretically and empirically analyzed the relationship between regional
unemployment rates and agglomeration. In the theoretical part of our analysis, we extended
a multi-region model of Helpman (1998) by incorporating search and matching frictions
in regional labor markets. In addition, we incorporate agglomeration externalities into
a search and matching framework. In the empirical part of our analysis, we examined
the relationship between regional unemployment rates and agglomeration (expressed as
employment density) by using Mexican municipal data. We also estimated the matching
function by using the data of job seekers, vacancies, and matched jobs.
An important prediction of our theory is that agglomeration can be positively or nega-
tively related with regional unemployment rates under negative agglomeration externalities
on matching efficiency. Thus, our theoretical framework with agglomeration externalities
on matching efficiency can describe a wide variety of relationships between regional un-
employment rates and agglomeration, with the relationship between nominal wages and
agglomeration positive, as supported by most empirical studies. Therefore, our model can
lead to predictions on unemployment rates and wages of both Harris and Todaro (1970)
and Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) within a unified framework.
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From our empirical results obtained with Mexican data, we found that denser areas
have comparatively low unemployment rates under negative agglomeration externalities
on matching efficiency. Considering our theoretical predictions, we conclude that in Mex-
ico, the agglomeration effect lowering the unemployment rates is much stronger than that
increasing the rates.
Appendix 1.A Derivation of Land Rent
The aggregate income of all regions is equal to the sum of their disposable labor income
and income obtained from land/housing services:
R∑
j=1
Yj =
R∑
j=1
[(wi − τ)(1 − ui)Li + (z − τ)uiLi] + (1− μ)
R∑
j=1
Yj.
Thus, the aggregate income from land/housing services in the economy becomes
(1− μ)
R∑
j=1
Yj =
1− μ
μ
R∑
j=1
[(wi − τ)(1− ui)Li + (z − τ)uiLi]
Dividing this by the share of regional labor force, the aggregate land rent in region i
becomes
Li∑R
j=1 Lj
(1− μ)
R∑
j=1
Yj =
Li∑R
j=1 Lj
1− μ
μ
R∑
j=1
[(wi − τ)(1− ui)Li + (z − τ)uiLi] .
Furthermore, dividing this by the workers living in region i, the land rent that individ-
uals receive becomes
h =
1∑R
j=1 Lj
(1− μ)
R∑
j=1
Yj =
1∑R
j=1 Lj
1− μ
μ
R∑
j=1
[(wi − τ)(1 − ui)Li + (z − τ)uiLi] .
See Helpman (1998) for more details.
Appendix 1.B Numerical Simulation Results on Other Variables
Figure 1.8 shows the numerical simulation results of the other variables under the assump-
tion of two symmetric regions. We assume that the agglomeration has no externalities on
the matching efficiency.
Figure 1.9 shows the numerical simulation results of the other variables under the as-
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sumption of two symmetric regions. We assume that agglomeration has positive externali-
ties on the matching efficiency.
Figure 1.10 shows the numerical simulation results of the other variables under the
assumption of two symmetric regions. We assume that agglomeration has comparatively
weak negative externalities on the matching efficiency.
Figure 1.11 shows the numerical simulation results of the other variables under the
assumption of two symmetric regions. We assume that agglomeration has comparatively
strong negative externalities on the matching efficiency.
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Figure 1.8: Numerical Simulation in Spatial Equilibrium When Agglomeration Has No
Externalities on Matching Efficiency
Note: Relative value of region 1 to region 2.
1.B Numerical Simulation Results on Other Variables 35
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0
Sh
ar
e 
of
 th
e 
Em
pl
oy
ed
 W
or
ke
rs
T
Region 1
Region 2
(a) Share of the Employed Workers
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0
La
bo
r M
ar
ke
t T
ig
ht
ne
ss
T
Region 1
Region 2
(b) Labor Market Tightness, θi
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0
R
el
at
iv
e 
N
om
in
al
 W
ag
e
T
(c) Relative Nominal Wage
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0
R
el
at
iv
e 
C
os
t-o
f-
Li
vi
ng
 In
de
x
T
(d) Relative Cost-of-Living Index
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0
R
el
at
iv
e 
Pr
ic
e 
In
de
x 
fo
r M
an
u.
 G
oo
ds
  
T
(e) Relative Price Index for Manufactured Goods
 0
 50
 100
 150
 200
 250
 300
 350
 400
 450
 500
1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0
R
el
at
iv
e 
La
nd
 P
ric
e
T
(f) Relative Price of Land/Housing Services
Figure 1.9: Numerical Simulation Results under Positive Agglomeration Externalities on
Matching Efficiency
Note: Relative value of region 1 to region 2.
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Figure 1.10: Numerical Simulation Results under Comparatively Weak Negative Agglom-
eration Externalities on Matching Efficiency
Note: Relative value of region 1 to region 2.
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Figure 1.11: Numerical Simulation Results under Comparatively Strong Negative Agglom-
eration Externalities on Matching Efficiency
Note: Relative value of region 1 to region 2.
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Chapter 2
Spatial Dependence in Regional Business Cycles:
Evidence from Mexican States∗
2.1 Introduction
As conditions in regional economies do not necessarily coincide with national economic
situations, regional business cycles tend to be highly heterogeneous. However, spatial prox-
imity seems to characterize similarity among regional business cycles. Thus, in light of the
interdependence of regional economies, we focus on the spatial spillover (or neighborhood)
effects that exist across regional business cycles. In such an economic situation, a region-
specific shock, for example, might propagate outward, toward neighboring economies. In
recent years, the importance of conducting spatial analyses of economic activities has been
emphasized from the economic stability and growth perspectives (e.g., World Bank, 2009).
We, therefore, investigate spatial dependence within regional business cycles.
Although spatial similarity—in terms of business cycles and spillover effects—has at-
tracted attention recently, the propagation process has not yet been investigated. To analyze
spatial dependence in regional business cycles and spatial spillover effects, we integrate a
spatially lagged dependent variable into a Markov switching model. In other words, our at-
tempt is to provide an integrated estimation method by using the Markov switching model
∗I would like to specially thank Alfredo Erquizio Espinal and Kensuke Teshima for their insightful
comments and helpful suggestions. I also thank Nobuaki Hamaguchi, Yoichi Matsubayashi, Akio Namba,
Tatsuyoshi Okimoto, Calros Urrutia, and participants in the 2013 Spring Meeting of the Japanese Economic
Association and in the Rokko Forum at Kobe University for their useful comments and suggestions. Nat-
urally, any errors remaining are my own. Furthermore, I am grateful for the benefits received during my
stay at the Instituto Tecnolo´gico Auto´nomo de Me´xico. This research was carried out under a scholarship
granted by the Government of Mexico, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mexico.
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and spatial econometrics. An advantage of this model is that it enables us to numeri-
cally simulate spatial spillover effects, thus enabling us to investigate the extent to which a
regime switch to recession in a regional economy may cause deterioration in the economic
conditions of neighboring economies.
Regional business cycles are not perfectly uniform, and thus, discussions of the national
business cycle are not directly applicable. For example, in applying the Markov switch-
ing model proposed by Hamilton (1989), Owyang et al. (2005) found that business cycles
across U.S. states differed considerably in terms of expansionary and recessionary phases.
Furthermore, Owyang et al. (2008) investigated business cycles at the U.S. city level, and
drew similar conclusions. To explain the similarities and differences within regional busi-
ness cycles, Hamilton and Owyang (2012) developed a Markov switching model based on
the rationale that administrative units do not necessarily coincide with economic zones.
In their model, U.S. states are endogenously grouped into clusters that share similar eco-
nomic characteristics by identifying common factors across states. Therefore, the authors’
focus is on regional recessions within each group.1 They found that states that have a
relatively high share of oil production or agriculture are likely to be in recession separately,
as compared to other U.S. states. In contrast, we focus on the spatial correlation of regional
business cycles, inspired by Owyang et al. (2005). From their empirical results, it seems
that we should pay more attention to the fact that state recessions appear to occur among
states located close to each other. Therefore, this paper emphasizes spatial spillover effects
of regional recessions.
We use quarterly indicators of state economic activity based on Mexican data. Previous
studies, such as those by Owyang et al. (2008) and Hamilton and Owyang (2012), use
employment data for business cycle analysis. This is because in the U.S., monthly or
quarterly economic activity indicators are not available at the city or state level. However,
employment data may not accurately reflect the regional economic situations owing to
labor market rigidities, especially when large regional differences exist within the labor
markets themselves. In contrast, in Mexico, the data on economic activity of each state
have been collected every quarter and published as an official indicator since the early
2000s.2 Capitalizing on these data, we investigate how a state recession, caused by the
1The approach of Hamilton and Owyang (2012) can identify regional common factors of business cycles
within Markov switching model. Regarding this, another major approach to regional business cycles is to
apply dynamic factor model. For example, see Kose et al. (2003), Owyang et al. (2009), and Hirata et al.
(2013).
2Note that a business cycle should reflect co-movements of a wide range of economic activities such as
output, employment, sales (Stock and Watson, 1989). Based on the spirit of Burns and Mitchell (1946), as
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global economic crisis of 2008–2009, spread to the neighboring states.
In the literature on Mexico, recent studies attempt to describe business cycles across
states. Note that the synchronization between the Mexican and U.S. economies has long
attracted economists’ attention. For example, Chiquiar and Ramos-Francia (2005) investi-
gated business cycle synchronization between the Mexican and U.S. manufacturing sectors.
Although this type of analysis does not account for regional economic activities, it is possi-
ble that such synchronization explains the differences within the Mexican states’ business
cycles. In that sense, Mej´ıa-Reyes and Campos-Cha´vez (2011) investigated the synchroniza-
tion between the Mexican states and the output of U.S manufacturing operations, finding
that Mexican states that occupy a relatively high share of the manufacturing sector are more
strongly affected by U.S. manufacturing production. Besides, to determine the phases of
regional business cycles and investigate regional differences during the economic crisis of
2008–2009, Erquizio-Espinal (2010) calculated the coincidence index across states, in the
spirit of Burns and Mitchell (1946). He found that the border states, which are closely
related to the U.S. economy, are more strongly affected by the U.S. recession. As empha-
sized in Mej´ıa-Reyes and Erquizio-Espinal (2012), one of the causes of the Great Recession
of 2008-2009 in Mexico was different in that instead of being caused by national business
cycles, it was caused by the recession that came from beyond national borders (exogenous
cause). This is consistent with Torres and Vela (2003) and Sosa (2008), who investigated
business cycle synchronization between U.S. and Mexico before the Great Recession of
2008-2009 in Mexico. However, a regional recession caused by U.S. economy spread across
Mexican states. Although some states did not experience recession in this period, recession
in their neighboring states would have caused a slowdown in their economies (endogenous
cause). Looking at the endogenous cause in regional business cycles, we try to estimate
the extent to which Mexican regional economies slowed down through this transmission
mechanism.3
This paper contributes to the literature by demonstrating how a region-specific shock
propagates to neighboring economies. In the literature on spatial econometrics, Anselin
(1988) established spatial econometric models that were able to account for spatial de-
pendence and heterogeneity. In this paper, we connect regional interdependence with
emphasized by Stock and Watson (1989), it would not be precise to define business cycles just in terms of
fluctuations in either GDP or employment. Nevertheless, a Markov switching model that uses the growth
rates of GDP has provided an insightful view on business cycles by estimating unobservable expansionary
and recessionary regimes.
3Delajara (2011) investigated the co-movement across states during the recession period of 2008–2009.
He pointed out the possibility of geographical propagation although he did not provide direct evidence. This
paper provides the lacking evidence to support his discussion.
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the discussion on business cycles in a macroeconomic time-series analysis by developing
a Markov switching model proposed by Hamilton (1989).4 In estimating the model, we
employ a Bayesian Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method.5 LeSage and Pace (2009)
described a Bayesian estimation methodology for spatial econometric models and applied
the Metropolis-Hasting (MH) algorithm to estimate a parameter measuring spatial depen-
dence. Hence, their study is notable in that the estimation method used is characterized by
the MH algorithm, rather than by Gibbs sampling.6 In this paper, we develop the Bayesian
MCMC estimation method proposed by Kim and Nelson (1998, 1999b,a) by introducing a
spatial autoregressive process.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the
Markov switching model, including a discussion of the spatially lagged dependent variable.
In Section 3, we present the Bayesian estimation procedure using MCMC. In Section 4, we
present the data. In Section 5, we discuss the estimation results. In Section 6, we provide
a numerical simulation of the spatial spillover effects of a regional recession. Finally, In
Section 7, we present our conclusions.
2.2 Markov Switching Model with Spatial Lag
In this paper, we construct a Markov switching model with a spatially lagged dependent
variable. Let yt,n denote the growth rate of an indicator of economic activity for region n at
date t. Using vector notation, we denote yt = (yt,1, . . . , yt,N )
 as an N ×1 vector, where N
represents the number of regions. Let W denote an N ×N spatial weight matrix (SWM).
Thus,Wyt indicates an N×1 spatially lagged dependent variable. Let st = (st,1, . . . , st,N )
denote an N × 1 vector of the indicator variable that follows a Markov chain. If st,n = 1,
then region n is in the expansion phase at date t, whereas st,n = 0 means that region n is in
the recession phase at date t. The Markov switching model involving spatial lag is denoted
4To the best of my knowledge, Ohtsuka (2010) is the first to introduce a spatial autoregressive process into
a standard Markov switching model, discovering that business cycles across Japanese regions are spatially
dependent.
5An MCMC estimation methodology for a Markov switching model was first suggested by Albert and
Chib (1993). However, there were questions related to how discrete, hidden variables ought to be sampled.
By developing the single-move Gibbs sampling initially proposed by Albert and Chib (1993), Kim and Nelson
(1998, 1999b,a) improved sampling efficiency by using multi-move Gibbs sampling for hidden variables. In
the literature on regional business cycles, Owyang et al. (2005) and Owyang et al. (2008) also adopted the
method proposed by Kim and Nelson for model estimation.
6This difference implies the need for modifications in the discussion on model selection. See Chib (1995)
and Chib and Jeliazkov (2001) for more detailed discussions.
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as follows:7
yt = ρWyt + μ0  (ιN − st) + μ1  st + εt, t = 1, . . . , T, (2.1)
where ρ is a parameter measuring spatial dependence in the dependent variable; μ0 =
(μ1,0, . . . , μN,0)
 is an N × 1 vector of the average growth rate controlled by the spatial
lag in the recession phase; μ1 = (μ1,1, . . . , μN,1)
 is an N × 1 vector of the average growth
rate controlled by the spatial lag in the expansion phase; ιN is an N × 1 vector whose all
elements are ones; εt = (εt,1, . . . , εt,N )
 is an N × 1 vector of the error terms that follows
i.i.d. N(0,Ω); and  denotes element-by-element multiplication.8
In model (2.1), we impose a restriction that μn,1 > μn,0, n = 1, . . . , N . This means that
the average growth rate in the expansion phase is higher than that in the recession phase.
We assume that error terms are independent across regions, that is, Ω = diag(σ21 , . . . , σ
2
N )
is an N × N diagonal matrix. We also assume that st,n follows a first-order two-state
Markov chain, indicating that the transition probabilities are Pr(st,n = i|st−1,n = j) = pn,ji,
i, j = 0, 1.
The SWM is a row-standardized matrix constructed from the data. In general, data on
contiguity or distance are used because the SWM is assumed to be exogenous. The SWM
describes a spatial spillover network across regions. The spatial autoregressive parameter
ρ lies in the interval of the inverses of minimum and maximum eigenvalues of the SWM.
As shown in Ord (1975), the row-standardized SWM yields +1 as the largest eigenvalue.
Therefore, we impose the restriction 1/ωmin < ρ < 1, where ωmin is the smallest eigenvalue
of the SWM.9 See Section 2.4 for a more detailed discussion of this.
Our Markov switching model includes a spatially lagged dependent variable Wyt.
Therefore, the coefficient parameter ρ measures spatial dependence in regional business
7Based on Hamilton (2008), a multi-regional Markov switching model involving an autoregressive process
of the dependent variable can be described as follows:
yt = Φyt−1 +μ0  (ιN − st) + μ1  st + εt,
where Φ = diag(φ1, . . . , φN) is an N×N diagonal matrix of parameters measuring the temporal dependence
in the dependent variable. Thus, our model is considered to be a Markov switching model focusing on the
spatial dependence in the dependent variable. To see which model fits data better, we will compare these
models in Appendix 2.D.
8One may consider another possibility of a spatial autoregressive process, that is, Wyt−1 instead ofWyt.
Consider a simpler version of model (2.1), yt = ρWyt−1 + μ+ εt, where μ = (μ1, . . . , μN ). By successive
iteration, we can show that yt = (I−ρW )−1μ+(I−ρW )−1εt, which is equivalent to yt = ρWyt+μ+εt.
Therefore, note that simultaneous spatial autoregressive process results from dynamic spatial dependence.
See LeSage and Pace (2009, Chap. 2) for a discussion on time dependence in spatial econometric models.
9For the SWM used in this paper, ωmin always takes a negative value, as it does in most cases. See also
Anselin and Bera (1998) for a more detailed discussion.
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cycles. An advantage of this model is that it allows us to simulate the spatial spillover ef-
fects for a particular region-specific shock. As described in Anselin (2003), if ρ = 0, spatial
spillover effects exist. Thus, based upon (2.1), we numerically investigate how a recession
occurring in a Mexican state during the period 2008–2009 affected the neighboring states’
economies.
2.3 Bayesian Inference
Bayesian inference, such as point and interval estimates, is based on a posterior distribution.
For convenience of explanation, we define here a parameter set θ = (Ω,μ,p11,p00, ρ), where
μ = (μ0,μ1)
, p11 = (p1,11, . . . , pN,11), and p00 = (p1,00, . . . , pN,00). Let Y = {yt,n} and
S = {st,n} denote a T ×N matrix each. Thus, by using Bayes’ theorem, we can derive the
following relationship regarding the posterior distribution:
π(θ|Y ,S) ∝ L(Y ,S|θ)π(θ), (2.2)
where π(θ|Y ,S) is the posterior distribution, L(Y ,S|θ) is the likelihood function, π(θ) is
the prior distribution, and ∝ represents “is proportional to”. An important result here
is that the posterior distribution is proportional to the likelihood function multiplied by
the prior distribution. We, therefore, need to specify prior distributions and to derive the
likelihood function to conduct the Bayesian inference.
2.3.1 Prior Distributions and Likelihood Function
First, we specify the prior distributions of parameters. Thus, we use an inverse gamma
distribution IG(ν/2, δ/2) as a prior for σ2n as follows:
π(σ2n) ∝
(
1
σ2n
)ν/2+1
exp
(
δ
2σ2n
)
.
As for a prior for μn = (μn,0, μn,1)
, we adopt a bivariate normal distribution N2(m,M)
as follows:
π(μn) ∝ exp
(
−1
2
(μn −m)M−1 (μn −m)
)
,
where we impose a restriction μn,1 > μn,0. Prior distributions for the transition probabil-
ities pn,11 and pn,00 are set to have beta distributions Beta(α11, α10) and Beta(α00, α01),
2.3 Bayesian Inference 45
respectively:
π(pn,11) ∝ pα11−1n,11 (1− pn,11)α10−1, π(pn,00) ∝ pα00−1n,00 (1− pn,00)α01−1.
Finally, we use a uniform distribution U(1/ωmin, 1) as a prior for ρ.
Next, we derive the likelihood function. To evaluate it, we consider two decomposed
terms by utilizing L(Y ,S|θ) = L(Y |θ,S)p(S|θ). From the assumption that εt ∼ i.i.d.
N(0,Ω) and by using variable transformation, the likelihood function conditional on S is
given by
L(Y |θ,S) =
T∏
t=1
[
(2π)−N/2|Ω|−1/2|IN − ρW | exp
(
−1
2
εt Ω
−1εt
)]
, (2.3)
where IN is an N ×N identity matrix and εt = (IN −ρW )yt−μ0 (ιN −st)−μ1st. As
for the second term, the difficulty is that the hidden variables S are directly unobservable.
To evaluate the likelihood function, we follow the methodology of Kim and Nelson (1998,
1999b,a). See Appendix 2.B for more details.
2.3.2 Posterior Distributions
Having specified the likelihood function and prior distributions, we are able to conduct the
Bayesian inference. From (2.2), the joint posterior distribution is given by
π(θ|Y ,S) ∝ L(Y |θ,S)p(S|θ)π(ρ)π(Ω)π(μ)π(p11)π(p00),
where p(·) is a probability mass function; an independent joint prior distribution across
parameters and regions is assumed. To facilitate explanation, let us define the following
vectors with respect to region n: μn = (μn,0, μn,1)
, sn = (s1,n, . . . , sT,n), and y¯n =
(
∑N
m=1 wnmy1,m, . . . ,
∑N
m=1wnmyT,m)
. However, a difficulty concerning sampling from
the posterior distribution arises because a Markov switching model includes hidden variables
S. Therefore, we present a more detailed discussion for the sampling methodology.
The sampling methodology is based on the conditional posterior distributions. Al-
though we assumed an independent joint prior, the conditional posterior distributions show
the same family as the priors, except for parameter ρ.10 Since the conditional posterior
distribution for ρ takes an unknown distributional form, we rely on the MH algorithm. On
the other hand, those for Ω, μ, p11, and p00 take known distributional forms, and thus, we
10The priors for Ω, μ, p11, p00 are conditionally conjugate.
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apply the Gibbs sampler for posterior sampling of these parameters.11
We derive conditional posterior distributions distribution for each parameter below.
The conditional posterior distribution for ρ|Y ,S,μ,Ω is given by
π(ρ|Y ,S,μ,Ω) ∝
T∏
t=1
[
|IN − ρW | exp
(
−1
2
εt (ρ)Ω
−1εt(ρ)
)]
, (2.4)
where εn(ρ) = yn − ρy¯n − μn,0(ιT − sn)− μn,1sn. Note that ρ is independent of pn,11 and
pn,00. As mentioned previously, this is an unknown distributional form. We, therefore, rely
on the MH algorithm. In the literature on spatial econometrics, LeSage and Pace (2009)
describe a sampling method for a parameter on spatial dependence using the MH algorithm.
Our sampling follows their method. See Appendix 2.A for details.
As for the sampling for the other conditional posterior distribution, although there are
slight changes, the sampling strategy is the same as the one proposed in Kim and Nelson
(1998, 1999b,a). Samples from these conditional posteriors are drawn via the Gibbs sampler.
First, the conditional posterior distribution for σ2n|Y ,S,μn, ρ takes the following form:
π(σ2n|Y ,S,μn, ρ) ∝
(
1
σ2n
)ν/2+1
exp
(
δn
2σ2n
)
,
where ν = ν + T and δn = δ + ε

n εn. Note that σ
2
n is independent of pn,11 and pn,00. We
can see that this conditional posterior for σ2n|Y ,S,μn, ρ is distributed as an inverse gamma
distribution IG(ν/2, δn/2). Next, the conditional posterior distribution for μn|Y ,S, σ2n, ρ
is obtained as follows:
π(μn|Y ,S, σ2n, ρ) ∝ exp
(
−1
2
(μn −mn)M−1n (μn −mn)
)
,
where
Mn =
(
M−1 + σ−2n X

nXn
)−1
,
mn = Mn
(
M−1m+ σ−2n X
(yn − ρy¯n)
)
,
Xn = (ιT − sn sn) .
Note that μn is independent of pn,11 and pn,00. The conditional posterior for μn|Y ,S, σ2n, ρ
is distributed as a bivariate normal distribution with mean mn and variance Mn, that is,
N2(mn,Mn). Finally, we derive the conditional posterior distributions for pn,11|Y ,S and
11Exactly speaking, the Gibbs sampling is a special case of the MH algorithm.
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pn,00|Y ,S that are given by
π(pn,11|Y ,S) ∝ pα11−1n,11 (1− pn,11)α10−1, π(pn,00|Y ,S) ∝ pα00−1n,00 (1− pn,00)α01−1,
where α11 = α11 + n11, α10 = α10 + n10, α00 = α00 + n00, α01 = α01 + n01, and nji is the
number of transitions from state j to state i. Note that pn,11 and pn,00 are independent
of σ2n, μn, and ρ. We see that pn,11|Y ,S and pn,00|Y ,S follow the beta distributions
Beta(α11, α10) and Beta(α00, α01), respectively.
2.3.3 Drawing Parameters from Posterior Distributions
We conduct the Bayesian inference via multiple-block MH sampling.12 Besides parameters,
a Markov switching model includes hidden variables S. Following Kim and Nelson (1998,
1999b,a), we use multi-move Gibbs sampling for drawing sn. In summary, our sampling
algorithm is as follows:
1. Set hyperparameters and the initial values for parameters.
2. Draw s
(g)
n |Y , θ(g−1) (n = 1, . . . , N) from the multi-move Gibbs sampling.13
3. Draw p
(g)
n,11|Y , s(g)n (n = 1, . . . , N) from Beta(α11, α10).
4. Draw p
(g)
n,00|Y , s(g)n (n = 1, . . . , N) from Beta(α00, α01).
5. Draw σ
2,(g)
n |Y , s(g)n ,μ(g−1)n , ρ(g−1) (n = 1, . . . , N) from IG(ν/2, δ/2).
6. Draw μ
(g)
n |Y , s(g)n , σ2,(g)n , ρ(g−1) (n = 1, . . . , N) from N(mn,Mn).
7. Draw ρ(g)|Y ,S(g), σ2,(g)n ,μ(g)n based on the MH algorithm.14
(a) Draw ρ′ from a truncated normal distribution TN(1/ωmin,1)(ρ
(g−1), 1) as a proposal
distribution q(·).
12Our sampling method is also called Metropolis within Gibbs sampling, which indicates a hybrid sampler
of the MH algorithm and the Gibbs sampling. We may interpret that parameters are drawn from the Gibbs
sampling in Steps 2–6 and from the MH algorithm in Step 7. However, in line with Chib (2001, p. 3591),
we use the notation of a multiple-block MH sampling because the Gibbs sampling is a special case of the
multiple-block MH sampling.
13See Appendix 2.B for more details. In the process of the multi-move Gibbs sampling, it is also necessary
to apply the Hamilton filter. See Appendix 2.C for details of the Hamilton filter.
14See Appendix 2.A for more details.
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Table 2.1: Prior Distributions and Initial Values
Parameter Prior Distribution Hyperparameters Initial Values
σ2n IG(ν/2, δ/2) ν = 6; δ = 0.4 σ
2,(0)
n = 1
(μ0n, μ0n)
 N2(m,M) m = (−0.5, 0.5); M = I2 (μ(0)n0 , μ(0)n1 ) = (−0.5, 0.5)
pn,00 Beta(α00, α01) α00 = 8; α01 = 2 p
(0)
n,00 = 0.8
pn,11 Beta(α11, α10) α11 = 9; α10 = 1 p
(0)
n,11 = 0.8
ρ U(1/ωmin, 1) ρ
(0) = 0
Notes: n = 1, 2, . . . , N . IG indicates an inverse gamma distribution. N2 indicates a bivariate normal
distribution. Beta indicates a beta distribution. U indicates a uniform distribution.
(b) Calculate the acceptance probability
α(ρ(g−1), ρ′) = min
[
π(ρ′|Y ,S(g), σ2,(g)n ,μ(g)n )q(ρ′, ρ(g−1))
π(ρ(g−1)|Y ,S(g), σ2,(g)n ,μ(g)n )q(ρ(g−1), ρ′)
, 1
]
.
(c) Generate u ∼ U(0, 1) and determine ρ(g) by using the following rule:
ρ(g) =
⎧⎨
⎩ρ
′, if u ≤ α(ρ(g−1), ρ′),
ρ(g−1), otherwise.
8. Repeat Steps 2–7.
In the above algorithm, superscript (g) refers to the sample from the posterior distri-
butions obtained in the gth iteration. Hyperparameters and initial values for parameters
are shown in Table 2.1. For the MH algorithm of parameter ρ, we use a truncated nor-
mal distribution TN(1/ωmin,1)(ρ
(g−1), 1) as a proposal distribution. In the simulation of the
posterior distributions, we discard the first 2,000 draws as a burn-in period. Descriptive
statistics concerning the sampled posterior distributions are based on an additional 10,000
draws.
2.4 Data
In this paper, we use seasonally adjusted quarterly indicators of economic activity by state.
The National Institute of Statistics and Geography (Instituto Nacional de Estad´ıstica y
Geograf´ıa, INEGI) provides the Quarterly Indicator of State Economic Activity (Indicador
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Trimestral de la Actividad Econo´mica Estatal, ITAEE) on their Web site.15 The period
for which data is available is 2003:Q1–2012:Q1 for all 31 states and the Federal District
(Distrito Federal). Although the ITAEE provides only data on aggregated sectors (primary,
secondary, and tertiary; financial intermediation services indirectly measured; and total
economic activity), it offers more disaggregated information on state economic activity
with respect to the time-series dimension. As regards the estimation of business cycles,
the ITAEE is the best proxy for the Gross State Product (GSP) and hence, can be used
to capture regional business cycles. We, therefore, use growth rates of the total economic
activity from the ITAEE.
To estimate a Markov switching model with the spatial lag, we need to specify the
SWM in advance. For robustness, we used several types of SWMs, such as those based on
contiguity and distance. The contiguity-based SWM is created from the contiguity matrix,
in which the nmth element takes a value of 1 if states n and m share the same border, and
0 otherwise. The distance-based SWM takes the following form:
wnm =
d−ηnm∑N
m=1 d
−η
nm
,
where wnm is the nmth element of the SWM, dnm is a bilateral distance between states
n and m, N is the number of states, and η is a distance decay parameter. The bilateral
distance is based on the great-circle distance between two states measured by latitude and
longitude (Vincenty, 1975).16 All types of SWMs are row-standardized. Note that the
SWM describes how a spatial spillover spreads across regions. In this paper, we report the
estimation results using a distance-based SWM (η = 4).17
2.5 Estimation Results
In Table 2.2, we present the point and interval estimates of parameters drawn from the
posterior distributions.18 Our particular interest is in whether spatial dependence exists
15Owyang et al. (2008) and Hamilton and Owyang (2012) use employment data owing to data limitations.
In the Mexican context, the quarterly indicator of state economic activity is readily available and is a more
appropriate measure than employment data in the formal sector.
16Data on latitude and longitude of each state capital are available from Annual Statistics of United Mex-
ican States: Edition 2005 (Anuario Estad´ıstico de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Edic´ıon 2005 ), published
by INEGI.
17The estimate of ρ obtained from this value was close to the average estimate of ρ obtained among
η = {1, . . . , 10}. In addition, we prefer the distance-based SWM to contiguity-based one because the former
can account for continuous space across regions.
18All numerical analyses in this paper were conducted on Ox Console 7.01 (Doornik and Ooms, 2006).
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Table 2.2: Estimated Parameters
ρ
Mean Median 95% CI
Spatial Dependence 0.28 0.28 [0.23, 0.32]
μ0 μ1
Code State Mean Median 95% CI Mean Median 95% CI
1 Aguascalientes −1.25 −1.32 [−3.12, 0.60] 1.15 1.15 [0.41, 1.91]
2 Baja California −1.34 −1.34 [−3.08, 0.28] 0.64 0.65 [−0.06, 1.35]
3 Baja California Sur −0.27 −0.14 [−2.19, 1.01] 1.02 1.00 [0.28, 1.85]
4 Campeche −1.35 −1.30 [−2.47,−0.53] −0.16 −0.31 [−1.26, 1.69]
5 Coahuila −0.70 −0.61 [−2.53, 0.69] 0.77 0.74 [−0.31, 2.05]
6 Colima −0.49 −0.41 [−2.20, 0.80] 1.12 1.06 [0.14, 2.42]
7 Chiapas −0.64 −0.56 [−2.26, 0.55] 0.57 0.52 [−0.46, 1.88]
8 Chihuahua −1.03 −0.84 [−3.34, 0.43] 0.64 0.62 [−0.22, 1.64]
9 Distrito Federal −1.70 −1.74 [−3.77, 0.27] 0.53 0.52 [0.11, 0.97]
10 Durango −0.61 −0.49 [−2.15, 0.30] 0.44 0.37 [−0.15, 1.57]
11 Guanajuato −0.48 −0.37 [−2.07, 0.64] 0.76 0.69 [−0.04, 2.05]
12 Guerrero −0.63 −0.57 [−1.94, 0.32] 0.55 0.52 [−0.02, 1.32]
13 Hidalgo −0.87 −0.76 [−3.03, 0.68] 0.90 0.89 [0.08, 1.78]
14 Jalisco −1.40 −1.24 [−3.95, 0.43] 0.62 0.62 [−0.01, 1.30]
15 Me´xico −1.65 −1.78 [−3.01, 0.34] 1.03 1.04 [0.55, 1.47]
16 Michoaca´n −0.68 −0.53 [−2.51, 0.48] 0.52 0.50 [−0.13, 1.35]
17 Morelos −0.41 −0.28 [−1.97, 0.52] 0.59 0.55 [0.00, 1.43]
18 Nayarit −0.50 −0.42 [−2.18, 0.79] 0.85 0.81 [−0.19, 2.15]
19 Nuevo Leo´n −1.11 −1.14 [−2.92, 0.61] 1.01 1.01 [0.31, 1.70]
20 Oaxaca −0.33 −0.17 [−2.02, 0.54] 0.64 0.53 [−0.04, 2.10]
21 Puebla −0.70 −0.60 [−2.63, 0.77] 1.00 0.98 [0.08, 2.01]
22 Quere´taro −1.79 −1.82 [−3.30, 0.05] 1.30 1.31 [0.73, 1.85]
23 Quintana Roo −0.79 −0.66 [−3.06, 0.95] 1.32 1.30 [0.17, 2.57]
24 San Luis Potos´ı −0.93 −0.88 [−2.79, 0.61] 0.90 0.90 [0.16, 1.71]
25 Sinaloa −0.50 −0.39 [−2.26, 0.69] 0.75 0.72 [−0.12, 1.88]
26 Sonora −0.49 −0.38 [−2.37, 0.84] 0.94 0.91 [0.08, 1.92]
27 Tabasco −0.25 −0.11 [−2.19, 1.09] 1.08 1.07 [0.33, 1.94]
28 Tamaulipas −0.69 −0.59 [−2.30, 0.46] 0.81 0.75 [−0.05, 2.07]
29 Tlaxcala −0.90 −0.78 [−2.72, 0.35] 0.55 0.52 [−0.17, 1.47]
30 Veracruz −0.36 −0.22 [−2.08, 0.67] 0.71 0.66 [0.02, 1.73]
31 Yucata´n −0.26 −0.17 [−2.10, 1.05] 1.23 1.20 [0.61, 1.99]
32 Zacatecas −0.34 −0.22 [−2.15, 0.90] 0.90 0.87 [0.08, 1.91]
Notes: 95% CI indicates 95% credible interval.
across regional business cycles, which is tested by the parameter ρ. The point estimates,
namely mean and median, take the value of 0.28 and the interval estimate, namely 95%
credible interval, shows a range of [0.23, 0.32]. Our estimation results, therefore, show that
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Table 2.3: Average Growth Rates and Sectoral Shares during Recession and Expansion
Phases
Dependent Variable: Average Growth Rate μ
Recession Expansion
Explanatory Variables Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err.
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing 0.019 (0.015) 0.000 (0.010)
Mining 0.035 (0.024) 0.048∗∗∗ (0.014)
Manufacture −0.018∗ (0.009) 0.010∗ (0.006)
Construction 0.073 (0.051) 0.005 (0.034)
Electricity, Gas, and Water −0.017 (0.031) −0.004 (0.015)
Commerce, Restaurants, and Hotels −0.026∗∗ (0.011) −0.005 (0.007)
Transport, Warehouse, and Communication 0.016 (0.026) 0.045∗∗ (0.017)
Financial Service, Security, and Real Estate 0.000 (0.020) 0.016 (0.013)
Common, Social, and Personal Service −0.035 (0.025) −0.006 (0.015)
Number of Observations 30 30
R2 0.888 0.946
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in the parenthesis. * denotes statistical significance
at the 10% level, **, at the 5% level, and ***, at the 1% level. The states of Campeche and Quintana Roo
are excluded from the sample. The explanatory variables are state-wise sectoral shares to GDP, and the
constant term is suppressed because the sum of these shares is equal to one. The uncentered R2 is used
because no constant term exists in the regression models.
business cycles across Mexican states are spatially dependent.19
From Table 2.2, we can see that average growth rates controlled by the spatial lag
in the recession and expansion phases differ considerably between states.20 To see more,
we regress the average growth rates in the recession and expansion phases on the GSP
shares by industry (% of GSP).21 Table 2.3 shows the estimation results.22 We find that
the manufacturing sector tends to have a negative impact on average growth rates in the
recession phase, whereas it has a positive impact in the expansion phase. As discussed
in Erquizio-Espinal (2010), we can see that although the border states have been growing
19The short time-period in our data might cause a bias in estimates. For robustness, we also used the
monthly state data of the coincidence index calculated by Erquizio-Espinal (2010) himself and used in his
paper. The data span is 2003:Jan–2011:Sep. From the estimation results of model (2.1), we confirmed that
spatial dependence in regional business cycles existed in his data as well because the point and interval
estimates of ρ were 0.30 and [0.27, 0.33], respectively.
20The complete estimation results are available in Appendix 2.F.
21In this regression, the dependent variables are average growth rates between 2003:Q1–2012:Q1. To avoid
endogeneity, we follow the methodology adopted by Owyang et al. (2008), and thus, we use the values of
2003 as explanatory variables.
22The constant term is suppressed because the sum of shares becomes 1. Campeche and Quintana Roo
are excluded because in these states, the sectors of mining and the sector of commerce, restaurants, and
hotels are comparatively large, respectively.
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rapidly by exporting manufactured goods, in the recession phase, their economies have
been more adversely affected.23 Besides, in the recession phase, a higher share of the
construction sector mitigates a decline in the growth rate. In the expansion phase, higher
shares of mining, and commerce, warehouse, and communication show positive impacts on
the growth rate.
Following Owyang et al. (2005), we provide Table 2.4 that shows when each state was
in recession during the period 2003:Q1–2012:Q1. Table 2.4 is constructed from the proba-
bilities of recession by state in Figure 2.1.24 We define that a state is in recession at date
t if the probability of recession during the quarterly periods t− 1 to t takes a value of 0.5
and over.25 The national recession period recorded by the INEGI was 2008:Apr–2009:Jun,
and thus the recessions that occurred in most of the states fell within that range as well.26
In addition, we should note that some states were in recession during the national recession
period, whereas others were not.27 According to our estimation results, ten states (Baja
California Sur, Chiapas, Nayarit, Oaxaca, Sinaloa, Sonora, Tabasco, Veracruz, Yucata´n,
and Zacatecas) did not experience any recession during the investigation period.28 A rela-
tively high proportion of agricultural activity or relatively low proportion of manufacturing
in these states might explain why they did not experience recessionary conditions, even
during the economic crisis of 2008–2009. The above-mentioned results are similar to those
of Erquizio-Espinal (2010) and Mej´ıa-Reyes and Erquizio-Espinal (2012), who calculated
the recession resistance index by state. They found that the states of Chiapas, Oaxaca,
Sinaloa, Tabasco, and Zacatecas demonstrated a relatively high level of endurance against
recession.
A noteworthy result in Table 2.4 is that the time at which a state enters recession differs
23Erquizio-Espinal (2010) emphasizes this point as “heads and tails” of globalization. Our results also
confirm his statement that economies facing globalization are likely to fluctuate.
24Figure 2.1 only shows probabilities of recession for selective states. The results for all the states are
available in Appendix 2.F.
25The probability of recession is calculated by 1 − G−1∑Gg=1 s(g)t,n, where G is the number of iterations,
and the superscript (g) is the gth iteration.
26Another national recession period is 2000:Aug–2003:Sep. However, we were not able to identify state
recession for that period owing to data limitations.
27Campeche shows a different movement from the other states. Annual growth rates of real GSP also
show highly negative values, such as −5.28% in 2006–2007, −2.96% in 2007–2008, −9.44% in 2008–2009,
−4.41% in 2009–2010, and −3.61% in 2010–2011. This tendency coincides with our estimation results in
Table 2.4.
28Note that our results might not identify state recessions in their entirety. For example, Nayarit, Sinaloa,
and Sonora may be considered to have been in a recession during 2008–2009. Their annual growth rates of
real GSP for this period were −3.64%, −5.12%, and −5.01%, respectively. Determining whether states are
in recession might depend upon the threshold of the probability of recession.
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(d) Tamaulipas
Figure 2.1: Probabilities of Recession for Selected States
Notes: Shaded areas correspond to the dates of recessions by INEGI.
between states. Figure 2.2 shows how the recession of 2008–2009 spread across states. As we
have shown that inter-state business cycles are spatially dependent, Figure 2.2 also suggests
that spatial proximity affects the propagation process of recession. Thus, we observe that
in 2008:Q1–Q2, Guerrero, Moreros, and Tamaulipas had all entered a recessionary period.
The recessions seem to propagate toward their neighboring states from 2008:Q3 through
2009:Q1. To evaluate the extent to which regional recession causes conditions in neighboring
economies to deteriorate, we conduct a numerical simulation of spatial spillover effects, as
discussed in Section 2.6.
2.6 Numerical Simulations of Spatial Spillover Effects
An advantage of the spatial autoregressive model employed here is that it enables us to
simulate spatial spillover effects.29 Based on the above-mentioned estimation results, we
29Anselin (2003) notes that the model with a spatially lagged dependent variable has a global spillover
effect that is characterized by an infinite series.
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(a) 2008:Q1 (b) 2008:Q2
(c) 2008:Q3 (d) 2008:Q4
(e) 2009:Q1 (f) 2009:Q2
Figure 2.2: Regional Spread of Recession
Notes: A colored state is in recession.
conduct a numerical simulation of spatial spillover effects, thereby analyzing both the pro-
cess by which and the extent to which a state’s switch to a recessionary regime causes
deterioration in the neighboring states’ economies. First, we derive the form of spatial
spillover effects that are decomposed into each wave. From the Markov switching model
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(2.1), we have the following equation:
yt = (IN − ρW )−1
(
μ0  (ιN − st) + μ1  st
)
+ (IN − ρW )−1εt,
where (IN − ρW )−1 is a global spatial multiplier that generates spatial spillover effects
(Anselin, 2003). We should note that there are no spillover effects when ρ = 0. Let Δst,n
denote a regime switch from st−1,n = 1 to st,n = 0 and Δyt(≡ yt − yt−1) denote an N × 1
vector of difference in growth rates. The impact of a switch to a recessionary regime can
be calculated by
Δyt
Δst,n
= −(IN − ρ∗W )−1n × (μ∗n,1 − μ∗n,0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cumulative Effect
= −(IN + ρ∗W︸ ︷︷ ︸
1st Wave
+(ρ∗W )2︸ ︷︷ ︸
2nd Wave
+(ρ∗W )3︸ ︷︷ ︸
3rd Wave
+ . . .
)
n
× (μ∗n,1 − μ∗n,0),
(2.5)
where (IN − ρ∗W )−1n is the nth column vector of the matrix, and ρ∗, μ∗n,0, and μ∗n,1 are
the posterior means. The first line indicates the cumulative spillover effects, and the second
line shows that the cumulative effect can be decomposed by the infinite geometric series.
Our numerical simulations are conducted based on equation (2.5).30
As a simulation exercise, we show decomposed and cumulative spillover effects of regime
switches from expansion to recession. First, let us explore the case of Aguascalientes, where
the manufacturing has a higher share in GSP. Second, we analyze the case of Tamaulipas,
which was in recession in an earlier phase during the economic crisis of 2008–2009. Figure
2.3 shows the case of Aguascalientes. A regime switch to recession affected the economies
of Guanajuato, Jalisco, Quere´taro, San Luis Potos´ı, and Zacatecas in the first wave. Sub-
sequently, although the impact was small, the economic deterioration caused by the shock
in Aguascalientes remained in Guanajuato, Quere´taro, and San Luis Potos´ı during the
second wave. The interesting finding was that Aguascalientes itself was also affected by
feedback-loop effects. During the third wave, the magnitude of economic shock diminished
significantly, but was observed in Guanajuato and Zacatecas. Cumulative spillover effects
are shown in Panel (d) of Figure 2.3. According to Table 2.4, Zacatecas did not experience
recession in 2008–2009. However, we can see that the recession in Aguascalientes caused a
slowdown in the economy of Zacatecas. Figure 2.4 shows the case of Tamaulipas. As before,
a recession in Tamaulipas diffused toward the relatively distant neighboring economies of
Aguascalientes, Coahuila, Hidalgo, Guanajuato, Quere´taro, San Luis Potos´ı, Nuevo Leo´n,
30In this framework, the spillover effects are symmetric between the two regimes of economic recession
and expansion.
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Figure 2.3: Numerical Simulation of Spillover Effects (Case of Aguascalientes)
and Zacatecas during the first wave. Furthermore, the economic shock occurring in San
Luis Potos´ı spread toward Aguascalientes, Coahuila, Guanajuato, and Nuevo Leo´n during
the second wave. The spatial spillover effects become negligibly small during the third
wave. Panel (d) of Figure 2.4 shows the cumulative spillover effects.
Furthermore, we calculated cumulative spillover effects for all states; these are summa-
rized in Table 2.5. As discussed in Section 2.5, the states with a higher share in manu-
facturing to GSP, such as Aguascalientes, Baja California, Mexico, Nuevo Leo´n, Puebla,
and Quere´taro had greater negative impacts on the neighboring states’ economies when a
regime switch from expansion to recession occurred. Since the second-largest impacts were
comparably small, we can see that the spillover effects diminished toward the more distant
states. Note that Distrito Federal, Mexico, and Quintana Roo still had greater effects on
their second-nearest neighboring states. In summary, our numerical simulation described
above demonstrates that a state’s regime switch from expansion to recession reduces the
quarterly growth rate of the nearest neighboring state by an average of 0.28% and that of
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Figure 2.4: Numerical Simulation of Spillover Effects (Case of Tamaulipas)
the second-nearest neighboring state by an average of 0.10%.
2.7 Concluding Remarks
The motivation for this paper derives from the idea that spatial proximity—which facilitates
business with neighboring economies through commuting, migration, and trade—might re-
sult in spatial similarities in regional business cycles. In such situations, region-specific
recessions would affect the neighboring economies. Thus, to investigate the regional prop-
agation process, we introduced a spatial autoregressive process into a Markov switching
model. This framework enabled a numerical simulation of the spatial spillover effects.
Thus, using data from Mexican states, we conducted numerical simulations to investigate
how the economic crisis occurring in a Mexican state during the period 2008–2009 affected
the neighboring states’ economies.
We showed that a parameter measuring spatial dependence takes a positive value; this
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Table 2.5: Ranking of Cumulative Spillover Effects by State
First Second
Code Origin State Code Destination State % Code Destination State %
1 Aguascalientes 32 Zacatecas −0.39 24 San Luis Potos´ı −0.13
2 Baja California 26 Sonora −0.38 8 Chihuahua −0.08
3 Baja California Sur 25 Sinaloa −0.26 10 Durango −0.05
4 Campeche 31 Yucata´n −0.30 23 Quintana Roo −0.04
5 Coahuila 19 Nuevo Leo´n −0.44 28 Tamaulipas −0.00
6 Colima 14 Jalisco −0.30 18 Nayarit −0.05
7 Chiapas 27 Tabasco −0.34 4 Campeche −0.01
8 Chihuahua 25 Sinaloa −0.14 26 Sonora −0.10
9 Distrito Federal 15 Me´xico −0.31 17 Morelos −0.30
10 Durango 32 Zacatecas −0.09 18 Nayarit −0.06
11 Guanajuato 22 Quere´taro −0.18 24 San Luis Potos´ı −0.07
12 Guerrero 17 Morelos −0.15 15 Me´xico −0.08
13 Hidalgo 9 Distrito Federal −0.25 29 Tlaxcala −0.15
14 Jalisco 6 Colima −0.18 1 Aguascalientes −0.15
15 Me´xico 9 Distrito Federal −0.46 17 Morelos −0.37
16 Michoaca´n 22 Quere´taro −0.14 11 Guanajuato −0.10
17 Morelos 9 Distrito Federal −0.16 15 Me´xico −0.14
18 Nayarit 14 Jalisco −0.20 1 Aguascalientes −0.07
19 Nuevo Leo´n 5 Coahuila −0.63 28 Tamaulipas −0.01
20 Oaxaca 21 Puebla −0.08 29 Tlaxcala −0.07
21 Puebla 29 Tlaxcala −0.50 9 Distrito Federal −0.01
22 Quere´taro 11 Guanajuato −0.47 16 Michoaca´n −0.18
23 Quintana Roo 4 Campeche −0.39 31 Yucata´n −0.30
24 San Luis Potos´ı 11 Guanajuato −0.22 1 Aguascalientes −0.18
25 Sinaloa 10 Durango −0.14 3 Baja California Sur −0.11
26 Sonora 8 Chihuahua −0.14 3 Baja California Sur −0.09
27 Tabasco 7 Chiapas −0.37 4 Campeche −0.02
28 Tamaulipas 19 Nuevo Leo´n −0.14 5 Coahuila −0.11
29 Tlaxcala 21 Puebla −0.42 9 Distrito Federal −0.01
30 Veracruz 29 Tlaxcala −0.16 21 Puebla −0.15
31 Yucata´n 4 Campeche −0.41 23 Quintana Roo −0.04
32 Zacatecas 1 Aguascalientes −0.28 24 San Luis Potos´ı −0.05
Average −0.28 Average −0.10
Notes: Based on calculation from equation (2.5).
provides evidence that spillover effects exist across Mexican states, and a region-specific
shock thus causes deterioration in the neighboring states’ economies through these effects.
Our findings from the numerical simulations show that a regime switch from expansion to
recession decreases the quarterly growth rate of economic activity for the nearest state by
an average of 0.28%. However, the spatial spillover effects have only limited impact on the
economies of distant states. As such, this paper emphasizes that geographical proximity
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does matter in regional business cycles. Therefore, our results have important implications
for policymakers. For example, if a regional economy begins experiencing an economic
downturn, the neighboring economies are also likely to slow down through the propagation
process. Therefore, economic cooperation with neighboring state governments may be a
solution for quicker recovery from a recession. In addition, spatial spillover effects are also
seen in the expansion period. Knowing this will shed light on which regions fully enjoy the
benefits of growth.
Finally, one limitation of this paper is that we have not looked at the sources that
strengthen spatial dependence in regional business cycles, such as trade, migration, and
capital flows. It would be possible to replace the geography-based SWM by the economic-
distance-based SWM, although the latter SWM is no longer exogenous variable and the
endogeneity must be controlled for. Thus, further research clarifying these should be un-
dertaken.
Appendix 2.A Drawing ρ by Metropolis-Hastings Algorithm
We use a truncated normal distribution as a proposal distribution. When the random
variable x has the truncated normal distribution TN(a,b)(μ, σ
2), the p.d.f. is
q(x) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
(1/σ)φ
(
(x− μ)/σ)
Φ
(
(b− μ)/σ)− Φ((a− μ)/σ) , if a < x < b,
0, otherwise,
where φ(·) and Φ(·) are the probability density function (p.d.f.) and the cumulative distri-
bution function (c.d.f.) of the standard normal distribution, respectively.
We use the probability integral transformation method for sampling from the truncated
normal distribution. We set μ = ρ(g−1), σ2 = 1, a = 1/ωmin, and b = 1. Following
Holloway et al. (2002), we introduce a tuning parameter c into the variance term, so that
the acceptance rate might fall within the interval [0.3, 0.7].31 When u is distributed as a
uniform distribution U(0, 1), we can draw ρ′ from TN(1/ωmin,1)(ρ
(g−1), 1) as follows:
ρ′ = ρ(g−1) + cΦ−1
(
Φ
(
1/ωmin − ρ(g−1)
)
+ u
[
Φ
(
1− ρ(g−1))−Φ(1/ωmin − ρ(g−1))]) .
31Holloway et al. (2002) originally set the interval to [0.4, 0.6], and LeSage and Pace (2009, Chap. 5)
adopted the same strategy. We chose a slightly wider interval of acceptance rate. The aim of tuning the
proposals is to ensure that the MH sampling moves over the entire conditional distribution. Thus, we adjust
the tuning parameter c by using the following way. First, we set c = 1 as an initial value. Next, the tuning
parameter c is adjusted by scale factor 1.01 depending on the acceptance rate (c × 1.01 if the acceptance
rate exceeds 0.7, while c/1.01 if the acceptance rate falls below 0.3).
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The acceptance probability α(ρ(g−1), ρ′) is calculated by
α(ρ(g−1), ρ′) = min
[
π(ρ′|Y ,S(g),Ω(g),μ(g)) (Φ(1− ρ(g−1))− Φ(1/ωmin − ρ(g−1)))
π(ρ(g−1)|Y ,S(g),Ω(g),μ(g)) (Φ(1− ρ′)− Φ(1/ωmin − ρ′)) , 1
]
,
where π(ρ|Y ,S(g),Ω(g),μ(g)) is calculated from (2.4). Because a standard normal distri-
bution is symmetric, φ(ρ′, ρ(g−1)) and φ(ρ(g−1), ρ′) are offset. Following step 7(c) in the
algorithm, we judge whether ρ′ is accepted or not.
Appendix 2.B Multi-Move Gibbs Sampling for sn
Kim and Nelson (1998, 1999b,a) are the first to apply a multi-move Gibbs sampling to a
Markov switching model. Our explanation here is based on Kim and Nelson (1999b). For
convenience of explanation, we define vectors s˜tn and s
t
n, and a matrix Y˜
t
by the following
notation:
s˜tn =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
s1,n
s2,n
...
st,n
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ , stn =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
st,n
st+1,n
...
sT,n
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ , Y˜ t =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
y1,n y1,2 · · · y1,N
y2,n y2,2 · · · y2,N
...
...
. . .
...
yt,n yt,2 · · · yt,N
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ .
The aim here is to obtain p(s˜Tn |Y˜
T
, θ). This can be rewritten as follows:
p(s˜Tn |Y˜
T
, θ) = p(sT,n|Y˜ T , θ)p(s˜T−1n |sT,n, Y˜
T
, θ)
= p(sT,n|Y˜ T , θ)
T−1∏
t=1
p(st,n|st+1n , Y˜
T
, θ).
(2.6)
Furthermore, the second term can be expressed as follows:
p(st,n|st+1n , Y˜
T
, θ) ∝ p(st+1,n|st,n, θ)p(st,n|Y˜ t, θ),
where the first term on the RHS represents the transition probability. Incorporating the
normalizing constant, we have the following probability mass function:
p(st,n = i|st+1n , Y˜
T
, θ) =
p(st+1,n|st,n = i, θ)p(st,n = i|Y˜ t, θ)∑1
j=0 p(st+1,n|st,n = j, θ)p(st,n = j|Y˜
t
, θ)
, (2.7)
where p(st,n = i|Y˜ t, θ) is calculated by using the Hamilton filter.32 The calculation step for
32See Appendix 2.C for details.
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(2.6) can be summarized as follows: first, we draw sT,n conditional on Y˜
T
and θ. Second,
given sT,n, the sampling st,n for t = T − 1, . . . , 1 is implemented by the backward recursion
based on equation (2.7)
Appendix 2.C Hamilton Filter with Spatial Lag
Hamilton’s (1989) filter is applied to calculate the conditional probabilities p(st,n = i|Y˜ t, θ)
for region n at date t. Based on Chib (1996, 2001), we explain how the Hamilton filter
is applied in the case where a spatially lagged dependent variable is included in a Markov
switching model.
Using scalar notation, the model (2.1) can be rewritten as follows:
yt,n = ρ
N∑
m=1
wnmyt,m + μn,0(1− st,n) + μn,1st,n + εt,n, εt,n ∼ i.i.d. N(0, σ2n).
For the conditional p.d.f. f(yt,n|st,n,yt,−n, θ), the expected value and variance become
E(yt,n|st,n,yt,−n, θ) = ρ
∑N
m=1 wnmyt,m+μn,0(1−st,n)+μn,1st,n and Var(yt,n|st,n,yt,−n, θ) =
σ2n, where the subscript −n indicates that the nth element is excluded from a vector.33
Therefore, the conditional p.d.f., which is used in the iteration process of the Hamilton
filter, is given by
f(yt,n|st,n,yt,−n, θ) =
1√
2πσ2n
exp
(
−
(
yt,n − ρ
∑N
m=1wnmyt,m − μn,0(1− st,n)− μn,1st,n
)2
2σ2n
)
.
The algorithm of the Hamilton filter consists of two steps: prediction and update. The
conditional p.d.f. p(st,n = i|Y˜ t, θ) is available by the forward recursion t = 1, 2, . . . , T .
1. Prediction Step: Calculate the probability
p(st,n = i|Y˜ t−1, θ) =
1∑
j=0
p(st,n = i|st−1,n = j, θ)p(st−1,n = j|Y˜ t−1, θ),
where, when t = 1, p(s0,n = i|Y˜ 0, θ) is replaced by the steady-state probabilities as
follows:
πn,0 =
1− pn,11
2− pn,00 − pn,11 , πn,1 =
1− pn,00
2− pn,00 − pn,11 .
33For simplicity, we impose a restriction on the calculation of expected value and variance. It is assumed
that for each region n, spatial lag
∑N
m=1 wnmyt,m is exogenously given.
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2. Update Step: Calculate the probability
p(st,n = i|Y˜ t, θ) =
f(yt,n|st,n = i,yt,−n, θ)p(st,n = i|Y˜
t−1
, θ)∑1
j=0 f(yt,n|st,n = j,yt,−n, θ)p(st,n = j|Y˜
t−1
, θ)
.
The probabilities p(st,n = i|Y˜ t, θ) are used in the multi-move Gibbs sampling. The proba-
bilities p(st,n = i|Y˜ t−1, θ) are also used for calculating the likelihood function in the model
selection.
Appendix 2.D Model Selection
To compare different econometric models, we calculate estimates of log marginal likelihood.
Chib (1995) proposes a procedure for calculating marginal likelihood in the Gibbs sampling.
However, in this paper, a parameter measuring spatial dependence ρ is drawn by the MH
algorithm, and thus, we employ a method proposed by Chib and Jeliazkov (2001).
The calculation of the marginal likelihood is based on the following equation:
m(Y ) =
L(Y |θ)π(θ)
π(θ|Y ) ,
which is termed basic marginal likelihood identity (BMI). The BMI consists of the likelihood
function, prior distribution, and posterior distribution. This identity holds at any θ. In this
paper, the mean of the posterior distribution θ∗ is used. Thus, by taking the logarithms of
the BMI and evaluating them at θ∗, we can calculate log marginal likelihood estimate as
follows:
log mˆ(Y ) = logL(Y |θ∗) + log π(θ∗)− log πˆ(θ∗|Y ). (2.8)
Based on (2.8), we calculate the following three terms: the likelihood function, the prior
distribution, and the posterior distribution, all evaluated at θ∗.
The first term on the RHS of (2.8) is the log likelihood function. Note that the Markov
switching model includes hidden variables {st}Tt=1. The likelihood function, therefore, takes
the following form:
L(Y |θ∗) =
T∏
t=1
⎡
⎣ 1∑
j=0
f(yt|st = j, θ∗)p(st = j|Y˜
t−1
, θ∗)
⎤
⎦ .
The second term in the brackets must be calculated in advance. This term can be obtained
from the prediction step in the Hamilton filter.
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The second term on the RHS of (2.8) is the logarithm of the joint prior distribution.
Since we assumed independent prior distribution across parameters and regions, the prior
distribution can be obtained as follows:
π(θ∗) = π(ρ∗)
[
N∏
n=1
π(σ2∗n )π(μ
∗
n)π(p
∗
n,11)π(p
∗
n,00)
]
.
The third term on the RHS of (2.8) is the logarithm of the joint posterior distribution,
which can be rewritten as follows:
πˆ(θ∗|Y ) = πˆ(ρ∗|Y )
[
N∏
n=1
πˆ(σ2∗n |ρ∗,Y )πˆ(μ∗n|ρ∗, σ2∗n ,Y )
× πˆ(p∗n,11|ρ∗, σ2∗n ,μ∗n,Y )πˆ(p∗n,00|ρ∗, σ2∗n ,μ∗n, p∗n,11,Y )
]
,
where
πˆ(ρ∗|Y ) = G
−1∑G
g=1 α(ρ
(g), ρ∗|Y ,S(g),Ω(g),μ(g), p(g)n,11, p(g)n,00)q(ρ(g), ρ∗)
J−1
∑J
k=1 α(ρ
∗, ρ(k)|Y ,S(k),Ω(k),μ(k), p(k)n,11, p(k)n,00)
,
πˆ(σ2∗n |ρ∗,Y ) =
1
J
J∑
k=1
π(σ2∗n |ρ∗,μ(k)n , p(k)n,11, p(k)n,00, s(k)n ,Y ),
πˆ(μ∗n|ρ∗, σ2∗n ,Y ) =
1
J
J∑
k=1
π(μ∗n|ρ∗, σ2∗n , p(k)n,11, p(k)n,00, s(k)n ,Y ),
πˆ(p∗n,11|ρ∗, σ2∗n ,μ∗n,Y ) =
1
J
J∑
k=1
π(p∗n,11|ρ∗, σ2∗n ,μ∗n, p(k)n,00, s(k)n ,Y ),
πˆ(p∗n,00|ρ∗, σ2∗n ,μ∗n, p∗n,11,Y ) =
1
J
J∑
k=1
π(p∗n,00|ρ∗, σ2∗n ,μ∗n, p∗n,11, s(k)n ,Y ).
The superscript (g) refers to the sample from the posterior distribution in the gth
iteration and (k) refers to the sample from the reduced Gibbs runs obtained in the kth
iteration. Note that some of the parameters are given as a mean in the reduced Gibbs runs,
and that ρ(k) is drawn from a proposal distribution q(ρ∗, ρ(k)). Besides the G iterations, we
need to implement additional 4×J iterations for the reduced Gibbs runs. The first reduced
run is for the denominator of πˆ(ρ∗|Y ) and πˆ(σ2∗n |ρ∗,Y ); the second is for πˆ(μ∗n|ρ∗, σ2∗n ,Y );
the third is for πˆ(p∗n,11|ρ∗, σ2∗n ,μ∗n,Y ); and the fourth is for πˆ(p∗n,00|ρ∗, σ2∗n ,μ∗n, p∗n,11,Y ).
We set J to have the same number of iterations as G. Moreover, the numerical standard
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Table 2.6: Log Marginal Likelihood Estimate
Spatial Dependence ρ Log Marginal Likelihood
Model Fitted Mean 95%CI Estimate NSE
MS-SAR
SWM: Contiguity 0.308 [0.262, 0.355] −2583.384 (0.514)
SWM: Distance (η = 4) 0.278 [0.231, 0.323] −2591.102 (0.337)
MS −2669.300 (0.207)
MS-AR(1) −2603.581 (0.239)
AR(1) −2646.631 (0.003)
MS-SAR-AR(1)
SWM: Contiguity 0.333 [0.282, 0.383] −2487.344 (0.293)
SWM: Distance (η = 4) 0.286 [0.235, 0.335] −2496.824 (0.548)
Notes: G = J = 10, 000. SWM indicates a spatial weight matrix. η is a distance decay parameter. 95%
CI indicates 95% credible interval. NSE indicates the numerical standard errors of the marginal likelihood
estimates. Models indicated in the table are as follows: MS-SAR: yt = ρWyt+μ0(ιN −st)+μ1st+εt,
MS: yt = μ0  (ιN − st) + μ1  st + εt, MS-AR(1): yt = Φyt−1 + μ0  (ιN − st) + μ1  st + εt, AR(1):
yt = Φyt−1 + μ+ εt, MS-SAR-AR(1): yt = ρWyt +Φyt−1 + μ0  (ιN − st) + μ1  st + εt
errors of the marginal likelihood estimates are also calculated.34 See Chib and Jeliazkov
(2001) for more details.
Table 2.6 presents the log marginal likelihood estimates with numerical standard errors
by using the different econometric models. First of all, it is useful to compare estimates
of log marginal likelihood between Markov switching model with a spatial autoregressive
process (MS-SAR) and Markov switching (MS) model because MS is a spatial case of MS-
SAR when ρ = 0. Consequently, it is supported to take into account spatial dependence
in regional business cycles. As explained in Hamilton (2008), Markov switching model
with a first-order autoregressive process (MS-AR(1)) is an extended model of a first-order
autoregressive process (AR(1)), which becomes MS-AR(1) if the constant term shows regime
switch. Our estimation results say that MS-AR(1) fits data better than AR(1). Then,
compared with MS-AR(1), we can see that MS-SAR is slightly supported. In the Mexican
economy, therefore, spatial dependence in regional business cycles matters, rather than
temporal dependence. Additionally, we estimated Markov switching model with a spatial
autoregressive process and a first-order autoregressive process (MS-SAR-AR(1)), which is
naturally supported against MS-SAR or MS-AR(1).35
34For calculation of the numerical standard errors, we need to select a lag at which the autocorrelation is
small enough to be neglected. Thus, we used the lag length 40.
35The estimation results of MS-SAR (distance-based SWM), MS, MS-AR(1), and MS-SAR-AR(1) are
available in Appendix 2.F.
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19 Nuevo León
28 Tamaulipas
24 San Luis Potosí
06 Colima
32 Zacatecas
01 Aguascalientes
11 Guanajuato
22 Querétaro
29 Tlaxcala
09 Distrito Federal
21 Puebla
17 Morelos
15 México
30 Veracruz
03 Baja California Sur
02 Baja California
18 Nayarit
Figure 2.5: Map of Mexico
Appendix 2.E Map of Mexico
State codes and names appear in Figure 2.5.
Appendix 2.F Details of Data and Estimation Results
This appendix provides details on data and estimation results and contains five subsections.
2.F.1 Data
Figure 2.6 shows the Quarterly Indicator of State Economic Activity (Indicador Trimestral
de la Actividad Econo´mica Estatal, ITAEE) from 2003:Q1 to 2012Q1. Figure 2.7 shows the
percentage changes of ITAEE, which are calculated by [log(yt,n)− log(yt−1,n)]× 100.
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2.F.2 Estimation Results of Markov Switching Model with Spatial Autoregressive Pro-
cess (MS-SAR); Distance-Based SWM (η = 4)
Table 2.7 shows the point estimates and interval estimates of parameters. Figure 2.8 shows
the probabilities of recession, which are calculated by 1 − G−1∑Gg=1 s(g)t,n, where G is the
number of iterations and the superscript (g) is the gth iteration.
2.F.3 Estimation Results of Markov Switching Model (MS)
The estimation results here are obtained by estimating the standard Markov switching
model:
yt = μ0  (ιN − st) + μ1  st + εt,
where εt ∼ i.i.d. N(0,Ω) and Ω = diag(σ21 , . . . , σ2N ). Table 2.8 shows the point estimates
and interval estimates of parameters. Figure 2.9 shows the probabilities of recession, which
are calculated by 1−G−1∑Gg=1 s(g)t,n, where G is the number of iterations and the superscript
(g) is the gth iteration.
2.F.4 Estimation Results of Markov Switching Model with First Order Autoregressive
Process (MS-AR(1))
The estimation results here are obtained by estimating the standard Markov switching
model:
yt = Φyt + μ0  (ιN − st) + μ1  st + εt,
where Φ = diag(φ1, . . . , φN ), εt ∼ i.i.d. N(0,Ω), and Ω = diag(σ21 , . . . , σ2N ). Table 2.9
shows the point estimates and interval estimates of parameters. Figure 2.10 shows the
probabilities of recession, which are calculated by 1−G−1∑Gg=1 s(g)t,n, where G is the number
of iterations and the superscript (g) is the gth iteration.
2.F.5 Estimation Results of Markov Switching Model with Spatial Autoregressive and
First Order Autoregressive Processes (MS-SAR-AR(1)); Distance-Based SWM
(η = 4)
The estimation results here are obtained by estimating the standard Markov switching
model:
yt = ρWyt +Φyt−1 + μ0  (ιN − st) + μ1  st + εt,
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where Φ = diag(φ1, . . . , φN ), εt ∼ i.i.d. N(0,Ω), and Ω = diag(σ21 , . . . , σ2N ). Table 2.10
shows the point estimates and interval estimates of parameters. Figure 2.11 shows the
probabilities of recession, which are calculated by 1−G−1∑Gg=1 s(g)t,n, where G is the number
of iterations and the superscript (g) is the gth iteration.
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Chapter 3
Do Workers Really Benefit from Agglomeration?
The Case of the Mexican Banking Sector∗
3.1 Introduction
It has been often said that our economic activities benefit from agglomeration arising from
interactions between job seekers and firms in labor markets, linkages between intermediate
and final goods suppliers, and knowledge creation and spillover.1 Duranton and Puga (2004)
studied the theoretical mechanisms that underlie the micro-foundations of agglomeration
economies. Rosenthal and Strange (2004) surveyed empirical findings to identify the factors
that enhance agglomeration of economic activities. The objective of these studies was to
uncover the source and nature of agglomeration economies. In recent years, there has been
an expanding literature on agglomeration economies that attempts to answer why workers
living in denser areas earn more than those living in less dense areas. The aforementioned
studies attempt to identify what factors explain wage premiums arising from agglomera-
tion and examine whether agglomeration benefits persist even after controlling for possible
factors.
The existing literature clarified the existence of an agglomeration effect on wages in
denser areas, resulting from positive externalities of agglomeration. Recent studies have
∗I would like to specially thank Kentaro Nakajima and Kensuke Teshima for their helpful comments and
suggestions. I also thank Nobuaki Hamaguchi, Yoichi Matsubayashi, Akio Namba, Komei Sasaki, and all
the participants in the 2013 annual meeting of the Applied Regional Science Conference at Kyoto University
and a seminar at the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry for their useful comments and
suggestions. Naturally, any remaining errors are my own. I am grateful for the benefits accorded to me
during my stay at the Instituto Tecnolo´gico Auto´nomo de Me´xico. This research was conducted under a
scholarship granted by the Government of Mexico, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mexico.
1Marshall (1890) was among the first to observe benefits from agglomeration of economic activities.
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investigated the possible explanations for this phenomenon from static and dynamic per-
spectives. Notably, two important ideas may reveal why wages are higher in bigger cities.
First, sorting of skills by city size explains agglomeration economies; inherently, high-skilled
workers tend to locate in big cities. This phenomenon has been explored by Combes et al.
(2008a), Mion and Naticchioni (2009), Combes et al. (2012b), and Matano and Naticchioni
(2012). Combes et al. (2010) noted that about half the agglomeration effects on wages
estimated without control variables are explained by spatial sorting of inherent workers’
skills.2 Sorting of skills is classified as a static aspect of an agglomeration economy. Sec-
ond, differences in city sizes give rise to differences in learning speeds. Workers in bigger
cities easily accumulate human capital by taking advantage of their meaningful experiences
there. de la Roca and Puga (2012) found that experiences accumulated in bigger cites make
the slope of the wage profile steeper, and this effect does not disappear even after migration
to smaller areas.3 Gould (2007) also found that human capital gains acquired from working
in big cities remain valuable for white-collar workers even when they relocate to rural areas,
although the same cannot be said for blue-collar workers.4 Learning by working in big cities
is classified as a dynamic aspect of an agglomeration economy.
In this paper, we explore the idea of agglomeration effects on wages, especially when
firms have branch networks. The existing literature has proved the existence of an agglom-
eration effect on wages even after controlling for spatial sorting of skills. However, agglom-
eration affects both workers and firms simultaneously. In fact, Combes et al. (2010, 2012a)
showed evidence that total factor productivities of firms in denser areas are also higher, due
to agglomeration economies. Thus, the manner in which workers directly benefit from local
agglomeration in bigger areas remains unclear when firms’ branches are located in less dense
areas as well. Specifically, this paper tries to clarify agglomeration effects on wages from
two perspectives. One effect is that workers directly benefit from agglomeration in denser
areas, that is, from a local perspective. Another effect is that workers indirectly benefit
from agglomeration through firms’ branch networks, that is, from a global perspective. In
the latter case, the branch network would be beneficial for workers employed in less dense
areas through transfer mechanism.
2Combes et al. (2010, 2011) referred to spatial sorting of skills as endogenous quality of labor. They
also examined endogenous quantity of labor, or in other words, the simultaneous causality of wage and
density. That is, more productive areas attract more workers, resulting in denser areas. However, the effect
of endogenous quantity of labor is not as strong as that of endogenous quality of labor.
3See also Puga (2010) for an explanation about learning by working in big cities.
4Glaeser and Mare´ (2001) and Glaeser and Resseger (2010) also found evidence of static urban wage
premiums, that human capital accumulation is faster in bigger areas, and that learning effects are stronger
in skill-intensive areas.
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For this purpose, we focus on banks’ branches networks. If workers directly benefit from
an agglomeration economy, higher wages would be paid in branches located in denser areas
after controlling for individual characteristics and occupation. If the indirect effect through
banks’ branch network is significant, bank fixed effects would be positively correlated with
agglomeration (e.g., average population density of places where each bank is located), thus
suggesting that higher wages might be explained by higher bank fixed effects.
For our empirical analysis, we need workers’ micro-data, including their firm-level in-
formation.5 The Mexican workers’ micro-data set from the National Survey of Occupation
and Employment (Encuesta Nacional de Ocupacio´n y Empleo) also provides information
regarding the names of the workers’ firms. Thus, we examine direct and indirect effects
of agglomeration on wages by making use of firm information. Notably, this paper focuses
on the banking sector, which suits the objective of this paper; in terms of population den-
sity, the banks have a large number of branches across different areas. Furthermore, since
banking services are offered locally, the effects of agglomeration economies are striking.
Conversely, for the manufacturing sector, factories might be located in less dense regions,
depending on transport costs. Thus, we consider that banks’ branches located in denser
areas strongly would affect workers’ and firms’ productivities, from a local perspective.
Our empirical framework follows the simplest framework proposed by Combes et al.
(2011), which integrates the agglomeration variable (e.g., population or employment den-
sity) into a standard Mincerian equation. This basic framework was also followed by Mion
and Naticchioni (2009).6 The coefficient estimate of the agglomeration variable measures
the extent to which the agglomeration economy leads to a kind of wage premium.7
We further assess what types of workers can enjoy more benefits from agglomeration.
The existing literature shows that depending on their education level, workers are differently
affected by the agglomeration economy. For example, Hering and Poncet (2010) examined
the micro-data of Chinese workers and found that high-skilled workers tend to benefit from
geographical externality whereas low-skilled workers do not. This difference is considered
to be remarkable in developing countries. We explore these possibilities by dividing the
5Mion and Naticchioni (2009) and Matano and Naticchioni (2012) used employee-employer matched
data. However, their motivations differ from ours. Our interest lies in identifying the direct and indirect
agglomeration effects on wages in branch networks.
6See also Combes et al. (2008a, Chap. 11).
7The endogeneity problem of population density gives rise to a biased estimator. Following Ciccone and
Hall (1996), we also use lagged population density as an instrumental variable. Although long-lagged data
is preferred, we use the population density in 1990. This approach is quite common in the literature and
has been used by Combes et al. (2008a), Mion and Naticchioni (2009), Combes et al. (2010), and Matano
and Naticchioni (2012).
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(a) GDP per Capita (b) Years of Schooling
(c) Population Density
Figure 3.1: Geographic Distributions in 2005
Notes: The spatially smoothed population densities are used. See Section 3.4.
Data source: SNIM 2005
sample by bank and workers’ education level.
First, we describe the Mexican municipal data. Figure 3.1 shows maps of gross do-
mestic product (GDP) per capita in Panel (a), average years of schooling in Panel (b),
and density of population aged 15 and over in Panel (c) in 2005. We can see that GDP
per capita and years of schooling are highly correlated. In addition, population density
also shows positive relationships with GDP per capita and years of schooling around the
central region of Mexico.8 Although years of schooling cannot capture unobservable skills,
the positive relationship between years of schooling and population density implies sorting
of skills by area size. In the empirical study, therefore, we analyze whether there is an
agglomeration effect on wages even after controlling for years of schooling and individual
observable characteristics.
This paper contributes to the existing literature on agglomeration economies by un-
8The administrative areas in the northern states are comparatively bigger than those in the central and
southern states and their population densities tend to be smaller.
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covering a route for agglomeration effects on wages in branch networks. Our empirical
findings show that agglomeration effects on wages continue to remain even after controlling
for individual characteristics, occupation, time effects, firm size, and bank fixed effects in
the pooled data. At the same time, workers indirectly benefit from agglomeration through
banks’ branch networks, suggesting that branch networks extend additional agglomeration
effects, especially to workers employed in less dense areas. Furthermore, we find that within
the banks’ branch networks, high-skilled workers are likely to benefit from agglomeration,
whereas low-skilled workers are not the case; the basic wage tends to be the same between
workers with regard to occupation, but the wage premium is likely to be paid based on
individual skills.9 To make matters worse, low-skilled workers can be negatively affected
by agglomeration as a congestion effect.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly document Mexico’s
banking sector. In Section 3, we explain the empirical framework used in this paper to
identify the effect of density. Section 4 presents the data. Section 5 presents the estimation
results and our interpretations for them. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
3.2 Mexican Banking Sector
In this paper, we focus on the banking sector in Mexico. Table 3.1 presents the list of
commercial banks licensed under Mexican legislation through the National Banking and
Securities Commission (Comisio´n Nacional Bancaria y de Valores, CNBV). None of the
workers in our data set works in 11 of the 42 commercial banks considered in this study.
According to Banco de Me´xico (2011), the large-sized banks in Mexico are BBVA Bancomer,
Banamex, Santander, Banorte, HSBC, Inbursa, and Scotiabank, which are part of financial
groups.
A characteristic feature of the Mexican banking sector is its considerably high share
of foreign capital. After the reprivatization of banks around 1991, the negotiation of the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) raised expectations about the entry of
the U.S. and Canadian banks into the Mexican market. The NAFTA has indeed played
an important role in reducing regulations for foreign banks within the Mexican banking
system. Simultaneously, the peso crisis in 1994 also greatly accelerated deregulation on
foreign investment in the Mexican banking sector, to attract more capital and keep Mexican
banks from collapsing (Lubrano, 1998; Minushkin, 2000; Sigmond, 2011). Then, regulations
on equity stakes were finally eliminated in December 1998, and the entry of foreign banks
9This view comes from the commission system and performance-related payment.
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Table 3.1: Commercial Banks in Mexico
Bank Name Assets Bank Name Assets
Large-Sized 4679.9 Small Subsidiaries of Foreign Banks 425.2
BBVA Bancomer 1263.5 Deutsche Bank Me´xico* 226.3
Banco Nacional de Me´xico (Banamex) 1112.1 Bank of America Mrrill Lynch* 51.9
Banco Santander 747.8 Banco Credit Suisse (Me´xico)* 47.8
Banco Mercantil del Norte (Banorte) 603.3 Banco JP Morgan* 40.3
HSBC Me´xico 485.5 Barclays Bank Me´xico* 18.5
Banco Inbursa 243.5 Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ (Me´xico)* 14.6
Scotiabank 224.2 American Express Bank Me´xico 12.6
Medium-Sized 767.5 Volkswagen Bank 5.2
Banca Afirme 104.3 The Royal Bank of Scotland Me´xico* 3.8
Banco del Baj´ıo 102.8 UBS Bank Me´xico* 2.3
Banco Interacciones 101.8 ING Bank Me´xico* 1.3
Ixe Banco 100.1 The Bank of New York Mellon* 0.8
Banco Regional de Monterrey 72.2 Associated with Commercial Chains 306.3
Banco Invex 43.5 Banco Fa´cil 174.9
Banco Monex 42.2 Banco Azteca 92.5
Banca Mifel 37.6 Bancoppel 18.0
Banco Multiva 31.8 Banco Ahorro Famsa 14.5
CIBanco 25.9 Banco Wal-Mart de Me´xico Adelante 6.3
Banco Ve por Ma´s 24.3
InterBanco* 17.8
Banco Compartamos 17.3
BANSI´ 13.5
Banco Actinver 11.7
Banco Base 10.4
ABC Capital 5.6
Banco Autofin Me´xico 4.8
Notes: As of December 2012. Assets are expressed in billions of pesos. * indicates no sample in our data
set.
Source: Comisio´n Nacional Bancaria y de Valores
finally got underway. The main transactions of acquisitions during the early 2000s included:
Santander (Spain) buying Serfin in May 2000, BBVA (Spain) buying Bancomer in July 2000,
Scotiabank (Canada) buying Inverlat in November 2000, Citibank (US) buying Banamex
in August 2001, and HSBC (UK) buying Bital in November 2002.10
Figure 3.2 presents the geographical distribution of the branches of the large-sized banks
at the municipal level. BBVA Bancomer has the largest number of branches in Mexico,
followed by Banamex. These banks cover the majority of Mexican municipalities and have
nation-wide banking networks. The locations of their branches, by and large, correspond
10See Minushkin (2000) and Turrent (2011) for a historical overview of the Mexican banking sector.
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(a) BBVA Bancomer (547; 1796) (b) Banamex (528; 1703)
(c) Santander (303; 1142) (d) Banorte (345; 1142)
(e) HSBC (328; 1040) (f) Inbursa (114; 294)
(g) Scotiabank (208; 639)
Figure 3.2: Banks’ Branches at the Municipality Level in December 2012
Notes: Colored municipalities have at least one bank branch. The numbers on the left-
and right-hand sides within the parentheses indicate the numbers of municipalities and
branches, respectively.
Data source: CNBV
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to municipalities with higher GDP per capita (Figure 3.1).
3.3 Empirical Framework
3.3.1 Theoretical Background
We slightly modify the micro-economic foundation suggested by Combes et al. (2008a,b).11
The profit of firm j operating in area a at time t is given by
πjt = ptyjt −
∑
i∈(j,a,t)
wit	it − rtkjt,
where pt is the market price of the product, and yjt is the output. For any worker i, wit is
the wage rate, and 	it is the amount of labor supply. In addition, kjt represents the other
factors of production, and rt is their market price.
We assume that the production function takes a Cobb-Douglas form with constant
returns to scale:
yjt = Ajat
⎛
⎝ ∑
i∈(j,a,t)
sit	it
⎞
⎠ξ (kjt)1−ξ , 0 < ξ ≤ 1,
where Ajat is the total factor productivity, and sit represents skills of worker i. It is
assumed that Ajat differs in terms of the population (or employment) density of area a.
This assumption reflects the empirical findings of Combes et al. (2010) and Combes et al.
(2012a) regarding agglomeration economies. Solving profit maximization with respect to
labor yields the following condition on the wage rate:
wit = ξptAj(it)at
(
kj(it)t∑
i∈(j,a,t) sit	it
)1−ξ
sit.
Matching it with the first-order condition for profit maximization with respect to other
factors, we have the following wage equation:
wit = Bj(it)atsit, where Bj(it)at ≡ ξ(1− ξ)(1−ξ)/ξ
(
pt
(rt)1−ξ
)1/ξ
(Aj(it)at)
1/ξ. (3.1)
We can see that wage of worker i differs in terms of total factor productivity Aj(it)at and
individual skills si,t in equation (3.1).
12
11Note that for simplification, we do not explicitly consider how branch networks affect the wage rate
between firms’ branches in this model.
12Combes et al. (2008a) also considered the case wherein inputs and output markets are segmented between
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3.3.2 Specification and Interpretation
To derive a regression model, we need to specify the firm productivity term Bj(it)t and the
individual skill term sit, respectively. First, assuming that firm productivity depends on
the population density of area a and firm-year fixed effect ψjt, we have
log(Bj(it)at) = α
j log(Densa(j(it)t)t) + ψjt, (3.2)
where αj is a parameter measuring how much agglomeration affects firm productivity. It
is considered that αj differs at the firm level.
Second, the individual skill of worker i is assumed to take the following form:
log(sit) = α
i log(Densa(it)t) +Xitβ + μi, (3.3)
where αi is a parameter measuring how much agglomeration affects labor efficiency regard-
ing individual skills, Xit is a vector of time-varying workers characteristics, β is a vector of
parameters, and μi is a worker fixed effect. In the spirit of human capital externalities noted
by Rauch (1993), Acemoglu and Angrist (2001), and Moretti (2004), we largely interpret
the idea of this externality such that the denser area affects labor (in)efficiency through the
exchange of ideas, imitation, learning by doing, and fierce competition in equation (3.3). It
is considered that αi differs at the individual level.
Taking the logarithm of equation (3.1) and inserting equations (3.2) and (3.3) into it,
we obtain the following regression model:
log(wit) = α log(Densat) + ψjt +Xitβ + μi + uijat, (3.4)
where α ≡ αj+αi, and uijat is an error term. For convenience of explanation, our notations
for firm and area indices j and a, respectively, are now simplified. Our empirical framework
may be interpreted as an extended approach that integrates the agglomeration effect into
a Mincerian equation.
The key point for empirical analysis is that the coefficient of population density α
captures effects of local agglomeration on wages through total factor productivity as well
as individual skills in area a. The coefficient estimate of population density measures the
overall effect among the effects from total factor productivity and individual skills, which
represents the benefits from local agglomeration that workers directly receive. Note that
in our empirical analysis, we interpret ψjt as bank fixed effects, not banks’ branch fixed
areas. In that case, wage differences across areas can occur through total factor productivity, price of the
output, or price of the other factor.
98 Chapter 3. Do Workers Really Benefit from Agglomeration?
effects.
Focusing on banks’ branches, we separately identify local agglomeration effects on wages
and the effect of global banks’ branch networks on wages. That is, α log(Densat) captures
whether workers employed in area a directly benefit from local agglomeration effects of
wage, and simultaneously, ψjt captures whether they indirectly benefit from bank’ branch
networks’ effects.
3.3.3 Estimation Strategy
The first objective of this paper is to examine whether the wage is higher in denser areas
and if so by how much. The wage of worker i employed in bank j and working in area a at
time t is given by
log(wijat) = α log(Dens
s
at) +Xitβ + ψj + τt + uijat, (3.5)
where α is a parameter of our interest, Denssat is the spatially smoothed population density
of area a, Xit is a row vector of the worker’s characteristics, ψj is the bank fixed effect, τt
is a time effect, and uijat is the error term.
13 Due to data limitations, we deal with banks’
branches at the municipality level. Owing to collinearity in the data, we cannot separately
estimate bank and individual fixed effects. Thus, individual fixed effect μi is dropped in
regression model (3.5). From coefficient α, we assess whether workers directly benefit from
working in denser areas. Furthermore, we investigate whether workers indirectly benefit
from banks’ branch networks by focusing on bank fixed effects ψj.
The second objective of this paper is to investigate whether a local agglomeration effect
on wages still exists among branches of the same firms. Previous studies on agglomeration
economies did not distinguish how workers receive the benefit from agglomeration within
the framework of a branch network. The existing literature showed that wages are higher
in denser areas. However, as agglomeration itself affects both workers and firms, this
finding does not indicate whether workers really enjoy the direct benefits arising from
local agglomeration. If the branch network plays an important role, workers will receive
agglomeration benefits from a global perspective, and not a local perspective.
The third objective of this paper is to analyze heterogeneous effects of agglomeration
13Combes et al. (2011) prefer a two-step procedure for identifying the effect of density. In the first step,
the wage is regressed on with area dummies. In the second step, the estimates of area dummies are regressed
on by population density. If we follow the same methodology, a problem arises. In our case, the sample size
is inadequate to allow consistent estimates of municipality dummies; some municipality dummies might be
estimated by using only a few workers. To avoid this problem, we introduce the population density directly
in the Mincerian equation.
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on wages between high- and low-skilled workers. The existing literature already mentions
that workers tend to be differently affected by the agglomeration economy depending on
skill levels. As stated earlier, Hering and Poncet (2010) analyzed the micro-data of Chinese
workers and found that high-skilled workers tend to benefit from geographical externality,
whereas low-skilled workers do not. This difference is considered to be remarkable in devel-
oping countries. We explore these possibilities by dividing the sample by bank and workers’
education level.
3.3.4 Estimation Issues
There are some important estimation issues to be controlled for. If we conduct a regression
analysis of model (3.5) by using ordinary least squares (OLS), the estimate of α might be
biased due to the endogeneity problem arising from several reasons. Combes et al. (2010,
2011) referred to two main sources of endogeneity: endogenous quantity and quality of
labor.14 As for endogenous quantity of labor, more productive areas attract more workers,
and consequently, the density also rises to a greater extent. To solve this endogeneity
problem, they suggested the instrumental variable (IV) method using long lagged density
variable.15 We also rely on the same estimation method by using lagged population density
by several decades.
The endogenous quality of labor underscores the workers’ skill differences across areas.
It is often said that skilled workers tend to prefer living in denser areas for several reasons,
such as better amenities in such areas. As a result, higher wages are observed in denser
areas. As seen in Figure 3.1, high-skilled people are likely to locate in higher wage areas
and in denser areas. In the literature of spatial sorting, individual fixed effects are included
to take into account unobservable individual effects. In this paper, instead of including
individual effects, we deal with this issue by including observable individual characteristics.
As explained previously, this is because area dummies and banks’ fixed effects cannot be
identified by collinearity.16
Furthermore, considering bank fixed effects is also of great importance. As noted before,
more productive firms are likely to be located in denser areas, and thus, the high correlation
14See also Combes et al. (2008b, Chap. 11) for a discussion on endogeneity problems.
15Ciccone and Hall (1996) originally used this method.
16In the literature for spatial sorting, individual fixed effects have been included to take into account
unobservable individual effects. In this paper, instead of including individual effects, we deal with this
issue by including observable individual characteristics. This is because municipality dummies cannot be
identified by collinearity unless there are movers between municipalities. Similarly, banks’ fixed effects
cannot be identified by collinearity unless workers have changed jobs between banks.
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between population density and firm fixed effect is expected. This point has not been
emphasized in most previous studies. We assess the importance of firm fixed effects in the
empirics of agglomeration economies by studying the correlation between estimates of ψj
and population density.17
3.4 Data
We use workers’ micro-data from the National Survey of Occupation and Employment
(Encuesta Nacional de Ocupacio´n y Empleo, ENOE) in Mexico. The ENOE has been
conducted by the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (Instituto Nacional de
Estad´ıstica y Geograf´ıa,, INEGI) every quarter from 2005.18 We use data for the time span
2005:Q1–2012:Q4. The ENOE contains data of individual characteristics (e.g., age, gender,
marriage status, years of schooling, and living state and municipality) and employment
information (e.g., hourly wage, occupation, firm name, industry classification, and firm
size).
Our dependent variable, hourly wage, is adjusted by using the consumer price index
(CPI) published by the INEGI. The base period is 2005:Q1. Spatial differences in cost-
of-living are adjusted by using area differences in minimum wages. In Mexico, there are
three categories of minimum wage depending on the degree of urbanization. The base area
is that of the lowest minimum wage of the three categories. In line with the literature
of pertaining to the Mincerian equation, we calculate potential years of experience by
subtracting six years and years of schooling from age.19 Besides, we control for gender,
marriage status, occupation, and firm size. We use the two-digit level occupation codes.
Firm size dummies are created for 1–10 workers, 11–20 workers, 21–50 workers, 51–100
17The estimates of bank fixed effects are calculated using areg in Stata. Consider a regression model:
y = Xβ +Dψ + u,
where D is a matrix of banks’ fixed effects, and X does not contain constant term. From the Frisch–Waugh–
Lovell theorem, we can obtain
βˆ = (XMDX)
−1XMDy,
where MD ≡ I − D(DD)−1D. We use estimates of bank fixed effects obtained from the regression
model
(y −Xβˆ)− (y¯ − X¯βˆ) = Dψm + v,
where y¯ and X¯ indicate average values of dependent and explanatory variables, respectively. Note that the
estimates of ψm are centered around the mean of ψˆ.
18The previous version of the ENOE, the National Survey of Employment (Encuesta Nacional de Empleo,
ENE) had been conducted until 2004:Q4. We do not use this database in this paper.
19When years of experience take on a negative value, we set it to zero.
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workers, 101–250 workers, 251–500 workers, and 501 workers and over.20
This paper focuses on the banking sector, especially commercial banks. The ENOE
offers the four-digit code of industry classification and also reports the names of banks. We
choose commercial banks licensed under Mexican legislation in August 2012. Finally, our
data set includes 31 of the 42 commercial banks.
Population density is available at the municipal level from the population census con-
ducted every five years. Based on the censuses, the National System of Municipal In-
formation (Sistema Nacional de Informacio´n Municipal, SNIM) provides its summarized
municipal data on population and area.21 We use the 1990, 2005, and 2010 population
censuses, in which population aged 15 and over is used to calculate population density.22
Then, we match the two data sets of the ENOE and SNIM by using the municipal code.
The key problem is that the geographical units correspond to administrative units, instead
of economic or employment areas. To mitigate this problem, we use spatially smoothed
population density.
Let zsa =
∑R
m=1 1am(d)zm denote the spatially local sum data of municipality a, where
R stands for the number of municipalities; zm, the raw data of municipality m; and 1am(d),
the amth element of the indicator matrix, in which the amth element takes the value of
1 if the distance between municipalities a and m is less than d km and 0 otherwise.23
We set d = 40 km. Thus, the spatially smoothed population density is calculated as
Denssa = Pop
s
a/Area
s
a, where Pop
s
a and Area
s
a are spatially local sums of population and
area, respectively, of municipality a. The descriptive statistics of the variables are shown
in Table 3.2.
3.5 Estimation Results
3.5.1 Agglomeration Effects on Wages in the Banking Sector
Table 3.3 presents the OLS estimation results of regression model (3.5). The coefficient
estimates of population density in Columns (1)–(4) show significantly positive values. In
20As noted in Brown and Medoff (1989), large-sized firms tend to pay more than small-sized firms. We
also control for firm size in the regression.
21The data are available in http://www.snim.rami.gob.mx/.
22There is no information regarding municipal area in the 1990 population census. Therefore, we comple-
ment municipal areas in 1990 with the corresponding data from the 2000 population census. In doing so,
we add the complemented data to that of the original municipalities.
23SNIM also offers the latitudes and longitudes of municipalities, from which the bilateral distances
between any two municipalities can be calculated using the formula suggested by Vincenty (1975).
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Hourly Wage (pesos, Price in 2005:Q1) 39.02 27.33 7.06 203.49
Population Density (Population/km2) 337.55 649.32 1.29 2789.27
Population Density in 1990 (Population/km2) 231.89 488.99 0.76 2050.07
Years of Schooling 14.26 2.80 0 21
Experience 12.75 9.95 0 67.25
Femal Dummy (= 1 if a person is female) 0.50 0.50 0 1
Marriage Dummy (= 1 if a person is married) 0.47 0.50 0 1
Firm Size Dummy (1–10 Workers) 0.17 0.38 0 1
Firm Size Dummy (11–20 Workers) 0.30 0.46 0 1
Firm Size Dummy (21–50 Workers) 0.27 0.45 0 1
Firm Size Dummy (51–100 Workers) 0.10 0.30 0 1
Firm Size Dummy (101–250 Workers) 0.05 0.22 0 1
Firm Size Dummy (251–500 Workers) 0.03 0.16 0 1
Firm Size Dummy (501 Workers and over) 0.08 0.27 0 1
Notes: The number of observations is 12875. Hourly wage is adjusted using CPI. In addition, spatial
differences in cost-of-living are also adjusted by area differences in minimum wage, and the base
area is that of the lowest minimum wage of three categories. Population aged 15 and over is used
to calculate of population density. Dummy variables of bank, occupation, and time are not shown
due to space limitations.
Column (1), the density elasticity of wage is 0.030. In this regression, firm size and bank
fixed effects are not controlled for. After controlling for firm size, the result does not change
much. The corresponding density elasticity of wage is 0.021. However, controlling for bank
fixed effects changes the coefficient estimate of population density considerably. In Column
(4), after controlling for both firm size and bank fixed effects, the density elasticity of wage
is 0.019, which is approximately 63% smaller than that in Column (1). These estimation
results imply that bank fixed effects are correlated with population density. Therefore,
omitting bank fixed effects leads to bias in the coefficient estimate of population density.24
Table 3.4 shows the IV estimation results. The coefficient estimates of population
density in Columns (1)–(4) are still significantly positive at the 10% at least. The F
statistic for weak identification (Weak IV) exceeds thresholds proposed by Stock and Yogo
(2005) for the maximal relative bias and maximal size. The results of the Dubin–Wu–
Hansuman (DWH) test indicate that endogeneity should be controlled for. The density
24The coefficient estimate of years of schooling shows a significantly positive value (0.050) in Column
(4). While the period of our data set spans from 2005:Q1–2012:Q4, the estimate takes a value very close
to that obtained in the existing literature. For example, Chiquiar (2008) estimated the Mincerian wage
equation by using Mexican micro-data gathered from the 1990 and 2000 population censuses. According to
his estimation results with full control variables, the estimates are 0.040 for 1990 and 0.051 for 2000.
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Table 3.3: OLS Estimation Results for Agglomeration Effects on Wages
Dependent Variable: log(wijat)
Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Population Density 0.030∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.019∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Years of Schooling 0.061∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Experience 0.020∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Experience Squared −0.018∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Female Dummy −0.024∗∗ −0.023∗∗ −0.031∗∗∗ −0.031∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
Marriage Dummy 0.075∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Occupation Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Size Dummy No Yes No Yes
Bank Fixed Effect Dummy No No Yes Yes
Number of Observations 12875 12875 12875 12875
Adjusted R2 0.299 0.301 0.333 0.335
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by municipality are in the parentheses.
Population density is expressed in logarithm. Experience squared is divided by 100. * denotes
statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level.
elasticity of wage in Column (4) is 0.016 after controlling for both firm size and bank fixed
effects. To sum up, the population density positively affects individual wage in the pooled
data set of the banking sector. Note, however, that the magnitude of population density on
wages decreases by introducing bank fixed effects and the significance level also falls, which
implies the existence of indirect agglomeration effects through banks’ branch networks.
Figure 3.3 shows the relationship between the bank fixed effects estimated in Column
(4) of Table 3.3 and the average population density of places where each bank is located.
Some banks are excluded due to small sample sizes. We select banks with more than 15
branches in our data set. Clearly, bank fixed effects are positively correlated with population
density.25 The robustness check for endogeneity is also done by IV. Table 3.5 shows the
25This positive relationship might reflect differences in the retail and wholesale banking between banks.
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Table 3.4: IV Estimation Results for Agglomeration Effects on Wages
Dependent Variable: log(wijat)
Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Population Density 0.025∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗ 0.016∗
(0.010) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009)
Years of Schooling 0.061∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Experience 0.020∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Experience Squared −0.018∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Female Dummy −0.024∗∗ −0.023∗∗ −0.032∗∗∗ −0.031∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Marriage Dummy 0.074∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.010) (0.015) (0.015)
Occupation Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Size Dummy No Yes No Yes
Bank Fixed Effect Dummy No No Yes Yes
Number of Observations 12875 12875 12875 12875
F Statistic (Weak IV) 2707.268 72725.203 2769.943 2743.229
DWH Test (p-value) 0.014 0.015 0.120 0.132
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by municipality are in the parentheses.
Population density is expressed in logarithm. Experience squared is divided by 100. The IV of the
population density is the population density in 1990. F Statistic (Weak IV) is robust Kleinbergen–
Paap rk Wald F statistic for test of weak instruments. DWH Test is a Dubin–Wu–Hausman test
for endogeneity. * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at
the 1% level.
OLS and IV estimation results of the following regression model:
ψˆj = δ + η log(Dens
s
c(j)) + vj ,
where ψˆj is a fixed effect of bank j estimated in Column (4) of Table 3.3, δ is a constant
term, η is a parameter of our interest, Dens
s
c(j) is the average population density of places
where bank j is located, and vj is the error term. We can see that IV estimation also
shows a statistically significant coefficient estimate of population density at the 10% level.
Therefore, thus far, our results imply that workers benefit from agglomeration directly as
well as indirectly through banks’ branch networks, that is, from both the local and the
global perspectives. The latter effects would be beneficial for workers employed in less
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Figure 3.3: Bank Fixed Effects and Population Density
Notes: The estimated regression line is
ψˆj = − 0.618
(0.354)∗
+ 0.104
(0.054)∗
log(Densc(j)).
where heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in the parentheses, and *
denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. See Table 3.5 for detailed estima-
tion results.
dense areas.
3.5.2 Agglomeration Effects on Wages between Banks’ Branches
We further analyze whether the local agglomeration effect on wages still exists among
branches of the same banks by exploiting our data set. Table 3.6 presents the IV estimation
results of regression model (3.5) by bank. We select banks with sample sizes exceeding 500.
The F statistic for weak identification (Weak IV) exceeds the thresholds proposed by Stock
and Yogo (2005) for the maximal relative bias and maximal size. The density elasticity
of wage in this case is significantly positive at the 10% level for Santander only. However,
the other banks do not show significant estimates. The magnitudes of population density
are also small for Azteca, Banamex, Bancomer, and HSBC. These results constitute great
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Table 3.5: Relationship between Bank Fixed Effects and Population Density
Dependent Variable: ψˆj
OLS IV
Explanatory Variable (1) (2)
Population Density 0.104∗ 0.101∗
(0.054) (0.053)
Constant −0.618∗ −0.602∗
(0.354) (0.346)
Number of Observations 21 21
Adjusted R2 0.130
F -Test (Weak IV) 14325.636
DWH Test (p-value) 0.454
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in the parentheses. Population density
is expressed in logarithm. Population density is average population density of banks’ locating
municipalities. The IV of the population density is the population density in 1990. F Statistic
(Weak IV) is robust Kleinbergen–Paap rk Wald F statistic for test of weak instruments. DWH Test
is a Dubin–Wu–Hausman test for endogeneity. * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level.
significance in the empirics of agglomeration economies; the effects of local agglomeration
on wages received directly by workers, on average, might cease to exist between branches
of the same banks.
Our interpretations of these estimation results are as follows. As shown in Figure 3.3,
banks located in comparatively dense areas benefit from agglomeration. As a result, higher
wages are offered to workers indirectly through banks’ branch networks. Thus, workers
might not benefit from agglomeration directly in the places of banks’ branches. We further
explore whether workers’ skill levels play an important role in benefits from agglomeration
in Section 3.5.3.
3.5.3 Heterogeneous Agglomeration Effects on Wages between High- and Low-Skilled
Workers
Table 3.7 presents the IV estimation results of regression model (3.5) by education level.
We divide the sample into high- and low-skilled workers. High- and low-skilled workers
are classified as those who have studied at the university level or higher and those who
have studied in a high school or at a lower level, respectively. As noted in Hering and
Poncet (2010), high-skilled workers are likely to benefit from agglomeration economies,
unlike their low-skilled counterparts. We further analyze the heterogeneous effects of local
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Table 3.7: Heterogeneous Agglomeration Effects on Wages by Education Level
Dependent Variable: log(wijat)
High-Skilled Low-Skilled High-Skilled Low-Skilled
Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Population Density 0.049∗∗∗ −0.017 0.037∗∗∗ −0.022
(0.012) (0.017) (0.011) (0.016)
Years of Schooling 0.058∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008)
Experience 0.022∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Experience Squared −0.025∗∗∗ −0.011 −0.026∗∗∗ −0.010
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007)
Female Dummy −0.020 −0.039∗ −0.027∗∗ −0.040∗∗
(0.013) (0.020) (0.012) (0.018)
Marriage Dummy 0.077∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.025) (0.018) (0.025)
Occupation Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Size Dummy No No Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effect Dummy No No Yes Yes
Number of Observations 9112 3763 9112 3763
F Statistic (Weak IV) 2405.624 2634.349 2467.517 2676.069
DWH Test (p-value) 0.446 0.005 0.762 0.015
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered by municipality are in the paren-
theses. Population density is expressed in logarithm. Experience squared is divided by 100. The
IV of the population density is the population density in 1990. F Statistic (Weak IV) is robust
Kleinbergen–Paap rk Wald F statistic for test of weak instruments. DWH Test is a Dubin–Wu–
Hausman test for endogeneity. * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level
and *** at the 1% level.
agglomeration on wages by bank.
Tables 3.8 and 3.9 present the IV estimation results of regression model (3.5) by bank
and skill level, respectively. Unlike Table 3.6, Table 3.8 shows that the population densities
for Banorte, Banamex, and Santander have significantly positive effects on wages at the 5%
level. High-skilled workers are likely to directly enjoy benefits arising from local agglomera-
tion even within the branch network. On the contrary, Table 3.9 shows that the population
densities for Compartamos, Banamex, HSBC, and Scotiabank have significantly negative
effects on wages (a positive effect exists only for Inbursa). Thus, low-skilled workers are
rather likely to suffer from local agglomeration in the branch networks.
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The manner in which workers directly benefit from agglomeration economies in terms of
individual skills is highly heterogeneous. More importantly and interestingly, high-skilled
workers are likely to benefit from agglomeration, unlike low-skilled workers. To make mat-
ters worse, low-skilled workers can be negatively affected by agglomeration as a congestion
effect in the branch network, wherein while the basic wage tends to be the same between
workers, it is likely to be paid based on individual skills through the commission system
and performance-related payment. Fierce competition in agglomerated areas might give
rise to negative externalities.
3.6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we examined whether workers really earn higher wages in agglomerated
areas. Previous studies on the empirics of agglomeration economies have shown that higher
wages tend to be paid in denser areas. However, agglomeration itself affects both workers
and firms simultaneously, and as a result, the route of the agglomeration effects on wages
received directly by workers was still unclear, notably when firms have branch networks.
Our objective was to study two possibilities: (1) wage is higher in denser areas even across
branches within the same firms, suggesting that workers directly benefit from agglomeration,
from a local perspective, and (2) branches of the same firms are, on average, located in
denser areas, and thus, their overall wages, on average, are higher throughout the branch
network, suggesting that workers indirectly benefit from branch networks, from a global
perspective. Furthermore, we analyzed heterogeneous effects of agglomeration on wages
between high- and low-skilled workers. Using Mexican workers’ micro-data sets, which also
includes their firm-level information, we analyzed agglomeration effects on wages by focusing
on the banking sector as it has a number of branches spread across regions throughout the
country.
We found that population density has a significantly positive effect on wages in the
pooled data across banks. These results are consistent with the findings of previous studies.
Furthermore, we found that banks locating branches in denser areas tend to pay workers
better, suggesting that workers indirectly benefit from agglomeration through banks’ branch
networks. Thus, branch networks would provide additional agglomeration effects, especially
for workers employed in less dense areas. More importantly and interestingly, we found
that high-skilled workers are likely to benefit from agglomeration, unlike their low-skilled
counterparts. Within the banks’ branch network, the basic wage tends to be the same
between workers in terms of occupation, but it is likely to be paid based on individual
112 Chapter 3. Do Workers Really Benefit from Agglomeration?
skills through the commission system and performance-related payment. Moreover, low-
skilled workers can be negatively affected by agglomeration as a congestion effect, and fierce
competition in denser areas might give rise to negative externalities. Our estimation results
suggest that all types of workers cannot necessarily enjoy direct agglomeration benefits from
a local perspective.
A limitation of our paper is that the dynamic aspect of the agglomeration economy has
not been examined. Even if there is no static agglomeration effect on wages, more valuable
experience in big cities might make the wage profile steeper. Another limitation is that we
did not theoretically explore how the wage system is determined within branch networks
in Section 3.3. It should be worthwhile to construct a more rigorous theoretical model to
uncover the underlying mechanism of branch locations and wage distribution in further
studies.
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